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Abstract 
 
While recent surveys have taken a special interest in culture to explain the failure of existing regulation, 
empirical evidence on the role of culture in influencing the regulation-performance link is still largely 
unexplored. In this paper, we ask the following: Should regulators and policy makers make room for 
culture as an effective tool for a successful bank regulatory environment? We identify three proxies for 
cultural values derived from Hofstede (1980, 2001) and the World Values Survey and investigate to 
what extent individualism, masculinity, and trust can enhance or impede the regulation-performance 
link for conventional and Islamic banks. Analyzing a panel of 729 banks operating in 33 countries from 
1999 to 2013, our paper provides empirical evidence that cultural values enhance the regulation-
performance link for the two bank types. Our results have important policy implications: our paper 
represents a first initiative and provides evidence that culture has merits and can be used as an additional 
tool to implement regulatory guidelines in a successful way.   
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1. Introduction 
Should regulators and policy makers make room for culture as an effective tool for a successful 
bank regulatory environment? The conventional banking literature has focused on the impact of 
capital, monitoring, and supervision on bank performance (Barth et al., 2013; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2013) and risk-taking (Klomp and De Haan, 2012; Li, 2017; Brandao-Marques, 2018). The Islamic 
banking literature has compared the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks (Beck et 
al., 2013; Abedifar et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2017a) and has recently shown interest in examining the 
impact of regulatory environment on bank stability (Weill et al., 2017; Bitar et al., 2017b). However, 
the question of whether cultural values can influence the association between capital, regulation, and 
bank performance (i.e., regulation-performance link) is still largely unexplored.1 
In this paper, we focus on two related issues: First, we investigate whether regulatory capital 
along with strong regulatory environment have the same effect on the performance of conventional 
and Islamic banks, and second, we study whether cultural values can influence the regulation-
performance link between the two bank types.  
Our investigation relates to three streams in the literature. The first stream studies whether 
formal institutions (measured using bank regulation, supervision, and monitoring) affect bank 
financial soundness. The banking literature provides abundant yet inconclusive evidence on the 
impact of regulatory capital, liquidity requirements, and strong formal institutions on bank 
performance and risk-taking (Klomp and De Haan, 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2013; Vazquez and Federico, 2015; Bitar et al., 2018; Brandao-Marques, 2018). However, studying 
whether regulatory capital along with strong formal institutions can affect the performance of banks in 
dual banking systems is also an important issue that requires more attention. The second stream of 
literature is relatively new and investigates whether informal institutions (often measured by cultural 
values, religion, preferences, and norms) affect bank financial soundness. While Boubakri et al. 
(2017) show that banks in high uncertainty avoidance, high power distance, and highly collectivist 
                                                          
1 In the following sections, we alternate between the uses of two terms: “the association between the use of regulatory capital, 
regulatory environment, and bank performance” and “the regulation-performance link”. Both terms represent the same 
relationship.   
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cultures have higher interest margins and return on equity during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, 
Ashraf et al. (2016) find that banks are less stable in low uncertainty avoidance, low power distance, 
and highly individualist cultures. More recently, Fongáčová et al. (2017) provide evidence that 
individuals with higher income, access to television, and religiosity have higher trust in banks. These 
two streams of literature examine separately the impact of formal and informal institutions on bank 
financial soundness. Our study combines both streams of research and asks whether cultural values (or 
informal institutions) can enhance the regulation (or formal institutions)-performance link for banks in 
dual banking systems. Finally, the third stream of literature is specific to the Islamic banking context. 
Two studies by Zins and Weill (2017) and Bitar et al. (2017c) show that applying a one-size fits all 
regulation can be harmful and thus less desirable in an Islamic banking context. Their findings suggest 
that the implementation of Basel II and the requirements to hold higher capital and liquidity ratios 
enlarge the risk and efficiency gaps between the two bank types at the expense of Islamic banks. More 
recently, Bitar et al. (2017b) find that compliance with Basel Core Principles (BCPs) improves the 
stability of conventional banks while the same effect is only marginal on the stability of Islamic 
banks. These studies mainly rely on questionnaire-based measures and on what is mentioned by 
formal institutions’ books and the country’s assigned laws. This can create biased measures and may 
underestimate the true variation in what is being executed. A more practical assessment is thus to 
complement formal institutional factors by controlling for various informal institutional factors such 
as cultural values.   
A prominent conjecture put forth in this paper is that while banking regulation can affect the risk 
and performance profiles of conventional and Islamic banks differently, we believe that culture can 
potentially explain some of these differences. Accordingly, finding the appropriate cultural values can 
also determine whether and how actions should be taken to fix and improve existing regulatory 
guidelines.    
Using data on regulatory capital, regulatory environment, and cultural values for 729 
conventional and Islamic banks operating in 33 countries and covering the period from 1999 to 2013, 
our multivariate regressions and system GMM estimations provide several new insights. We find that 
regulatory capital and regulatory environment have a positive and significant effect on the 
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performance of conventional banks, while this effect is either marginal or insignificant on the 
performance of Islamic banks. In addition, the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment 
on bank performance is reinforced by the presence of the appropriate cultural values. Precisely, we 
find that the regulation-performance link is stronger on conventional banks in countries with cultural 
values that are more trustful, less individualistic, and less masculine while the culture effect is 
inconsistent for Islamic banks. In addition, differences in the effect of capital and regulatory 
environment on the performance of the two bank types – as expressed in recent studies such as Bitar 
et al. (2017b) and Bitar et al. (2017c) – can be explained by differences in the effect of cultural values 
on the performance of these banks. Overall, we show that less individualism, less masculinity, and 
higher trust cultural values appear to produce a stronger association between regulation and bank 
performance. This association appears to be stronger on the performance of conventional banks than 
on the performance of Islamic banks. Our results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, 
including alternative dependent and independent variables, alternative cultural measures, a system 
GMM and a Heckman estimation technique to control for endogeneity and selection bias, and a 
propensity score matching technique (PSM) to reduce any bias in sample size. 
This paper has three important contributions. First, it provides robust evidence on the influence 
of cultural values on the regulation-performance link. While recent literature argues that conventional 
banking regulation can increase the risk and the performance gaps between the two bank types at the 
expense of Islamic banks if it does take into consideration some of the Islamic banks’ specificities, we 
find that implementing the appropriate cultural values can reduce these gaps and enhance the 
regulation-performance link between the two bank types. Second, this investigation shows that 
performance of a dual banking system can be enhanced with cultural values that are more trustful, less 
individualistic, and less masculine. Finally, we add to the recent discussions by rating agencies (e.g. 
Deloitte, 2013; PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2014; KPMG, 2016) and show that developing the 
appropriate cultural values can provide regulators and policy makers with an additional tool to create 
more favorable conditions to implement regulatory guidelines in a successful way. This paper 
therefore constitutes an empirical response to this discussion.     
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review 
on cultural values and derives our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample, the econometric design, 
and the variables involved and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results while section 5 reports the robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background and hypotheses development  
In this paper, we follow a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we build on the existing 
literature on bank regulation and supervision (e.g. Klomp and De Haan, 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Li, 
2017; Brandao-Marques, 2018) and examine the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory 
environment on bank performance. We revisit the recent literature on regulation, risk, and 
performance of conventional and Islamic banks (Weill and Zins, 2017, Bitar et al., 2017b; Bitar et al., 
2017c) and pose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment is more pronounced on the 
performance of conventional banks than on the performance of Islamic banks.     
In the second stage, we examine whether cultural values can influence the association between 
regulatory capital, regulatory environment, and bank performance. Recent surveys and reports have 
taken a special interest in culture to explain the failure of existing regulation and supervision in 
preventing the occurrence of financial crises (Deloitte, 2013; PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2014; 
KPMG, 2016). We argue that if culture can influence the regulation-performance link of conventional 
banks then it can potentially influence the regulation-performance link of Islamic banks as well. In 
addition, while the results from previous studies suggest a significant difference in the effect of 
regulation on the performance of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks, we argue that some 
of these differences can be explained by culture. Finally, because Islamic banks involve wider ethical 
and moral issues (Khan, 2010) and because they promote greater economic equity and justice 
(Gheeraert, 2014), the cultural effect can be even more significant on their regulation-performance 
link compared to conventional counterparts.   
Ahern et al. (2015) argue that cultural values are likely to affect the economic and work 
preferences of individuals in significant ways. They refer to Guiso et al. (2006) and define culture as 
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“those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social groups transmit fairly unchanged 
from generation to generation”. Similarly, Boubakri et al. (2017) explain that culture can affect 
economic outcomes (i.e. a country’s growth, financial systems, and legal institutions). The authors 
quote from Hofstede (2001) to define culture as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. In this work, we define 
culture as the “shared norms within an organization that are evidenced through behavior.” 2 
Accordingly, cultural values can be considered as an effective tool to transmit norms within banking 
institutions and helping new employees assimilate to those norms. What is important to clarify here is 
that these norms are distinct from regulation and sometimes contradictory. For instance, junior 
bankers do not typically consult the rules for guidance on a daily basis. As new employees, they learn 
from their peers and supervisors how to conduct business. Depending on the institution’s shared 
culture (and not necessarily the existing regulation), employees would gauge differences between 
what is right and what is wrong. Therefore, employees’ misconduct (e.g. promoting excessive risk-
taking, overconfidence in making decisions, aggressive competition, etc.) can be considered right if it 
appears to be accepted or ordinary by the banking institution’s culture and hence no corrective actions 
would be required. Under these circumstances, culture can cause trouble for regulators. This was 
evident during the 2007-2009 financial crisis where large financial institutions used culture as an 
excuse to break regulation. Cultural excuses can be used to encourage wrong or risky practices as long 
as they lead to higher performance, bonuses, and higher pay packages at the end of the year. 
Regulators explain recent scandals such as LIBOR and Forex manipulation by referring to the 
dysfunctional culture of financial services (PWC, 2014). According to the general council of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York “everyone should be concerned with culture in financial services” 
(New York Times, 2017). It is true that regulatory capital and regulatory environment are important 
but they are not sufficient. In other words, available laws on the books do not necessarily mean that 
people will follow them and thus gaps in regulatory guidelines are inevitable. Developing the 
                                                          
2 From the speech of Michael Held, the Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on “Reforming 
culture and conduct in the financial services industry: How can lawyers help?” (March, 2017). 
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appropriate culture can fill those gaps and hence provide a better regulatory environment and banking 
performance.    
The particular cultural dimensions in focus in this paper are individualism, masculinity, and 
trust. These dimensions have not previously received proper attention in the empirical literature on 
regulation and bank performance. Ang and Fredriksson (2018) refer to individualism as one of the 
most important dimensions in explaining cultural values. While highly individualistic countries devote 
special attention to self-reliance, risk-taking, and achievement, less individualistic countries 
accommodate collaboration and solidarity while emphasizing the importance of the team or the group 
to which an individual belongs. In the former, the employer-employee relationship is essentially a 
business relationship where poor performance is a reason for dismissal, while in the latter the 
relationship is moral and similar to a family link where poor performance is a reason for more training 
and a second chance. In addition, in highly individualistic countries, work decisions are the product of 
an individual rather than the group, and these decisions are often driven by overconfidence and over-
optimism (Chui et al. 2010). Furthermore, independent decisions can involve higher risky behavior of 
managers (Morris et al. 1993) since individual decisions are more risk-tolerant than group decisions 
(Shupp and Williamson, 2008). Furthermore, individualistic countries value equality less; they 
promote competition and tend to maximize their private benefits and switch jobs when offered higher 
salaries and benefits (Callero, 2017). They consider the government as a barrier to achievement since 
it promotes collective actions towards the well-being of society. Less individualistic countries, 
however, have a more favorable view of the government where collective actions, regulation, and 
supervision can improve the performance of the banking system and promote equality and balance in 
the employer-employee relationship. Building on these factors, we derive the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2. In highly individualistic countries, the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory 
environment is less pronounced on the performance of conventional and Islamic banks than in less 
individualistic countries.     
Second, we refer to the newly emerged literature on masculinity (Jia et al., 2014) as a second 
proxy for cultural values. In Hofstede’s framework, highly masculine countries are goal-oriented; 
winning is appreciated and often rewarded and admired regardless of the tools or procedures used to 
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achieve this goal. Performance is measured by material success in a society where aggressive 
economic growth is a priority. Similar to individualistic countries, in highly masculine countries, there 
is no room for failure and some highly qualified administrative positions are reserved for men. The 
gender wage gap is significant, communication is relatively weak, and conflicts can be solved through 
force. According to Jia et al. (2014) masculine behavior includes aggression, egocentrism, risk-
seeking, and a desire to maintain social status. As a result, being aggressive and risk-tolerant might 
propel the firm forward and push boundaries to achieve higher performance, regardless of existing 
regulation. Accordingly, highly masculine countries might consider regulation as a barrier to 
development, a constraint against taking risk, and an unnecessary cost that can reduce bank efficiency. 
Banking culture can thus be used as an excuse to go around or break regulation. In contrast, less 
masculine countries are relationship- and process-oriented; they believe in communication and 
negotiation to solve conflicts. In addition, failure is considered a part of the learning process, wages 
are supposed to be equal between genders, and highly qualified positions should be equally divided 
between men and women. Governmental policies are welcomed and supported in less masculine 
countries; they provide clear regulatory guidelines to supervise banking institutions to control risk-
taking activities, enhance equality between genders, and promote balance in the employer-employee 
relationship. Building on these factors, we present the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3. In highly masculine countries, the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory 
environment is less pronounced on the performance of conventional and Islamic banks than in less 
masculine countries.     
Finally, we refer to the literature on social capital and use a measure of trust as a third proxy for 
cultural values. According to Fongáčová et al. (2017) trust can be defined as “a remarkably efficient 
lubricant to economics exchange that reduces complex realities far more quickly than prediction, 
authority, or bargaining”. High trust can therefore lead to better economic performance by reducing 
transaction costs and the risk of fraud and theft (Lim et al., 2018). Regulation in high-trust countries 
can be seen as a way to promote information disclosure and reduce adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Communication between regulators and bankers is built on trust and different channels can be 
used to report incidents and improve contingency plans in cases of financial distress. High trust can 
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also play a role in improving the reputation of financial institutions. For instance, a survey by PWC 
(2014) shows that 59% of the financial services industry believe that lack of trust in their business is a 
threat to growth. Fongáčová et al. (2017) measure the trust in banks as the combination of the 
individual trust in the stability of the financial system (e.g. the confidence in the deposit insurance 
scheme and the regulatory and supervisory authorities) and the trust in the honesty of bankers. Based 
on the above, we posit the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 4. In high-trust countries, the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment is 
more pronounced on the performance of conventional and Islamic banks than in less trustful 
countries. 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1. Sample 
We use Bankscope as a primary source of data for this study. For each bank in the sample, we 
retrieve annual data from 1999 to 2013. Our data is unbalanced and the number of conventional 
(Islamic) banks varies between 377 (44) banks (at the lowest) in 1999 and 590 (139) banks in 2012 (at 
the highest). Macroeconomic data such as the GDP growth rate is obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators, whereas regulatory variables are obtained from the World Bank’s 
Banking Regulation and Supervision database. Data on culture is obtained from Hofstede (1980, 
2001) and the World Values Surveys (WVS). A bank is excluded from the sample if it does not have 
at least 3 continuous observations. In addition, we remove countries that have data for fewer than 4 
banks. Furthermore, when we investigate the effect of cultural values on the regulation-performance 
link, we lose countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Cayman 
Islands, and Senegal because they do not have available information on the three measures of cultural 
values. Finally, while some of the banks have Islamic windows, the bulk of their operations are 
conventional. Therefore, we expect that the impact of regulatory capital and regulatory environment 
on profitability ratio will remain identical without the exclusion of these banks. 
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3.2. Econometric design and variables  
We examine the relation between capital ratios and bank profitability by employing the 
following multivariate regression models:3 
ROAAijt = α + β1 × Reg_capijt + β3 × bankcontrolijt + β3 × countrycontroljt
+ Cc + YY  +  εijt                                                                                               (1) 
ROAAijt = α + β1 × IBDV × Reg_capijt × RegIns + β2 ×  CBDV × Reg_capijt × RegIns
+ β3 × bankcontrolijt + β3 × countrycontroljt
+ Cc + YY  +  εijt                                                     (2) 
where i refers to bank i’s performance ratio in country j in year t. We measure for performance using 
the ratio of net income to three year average assets (ROAA).  Reg_capijt is the bank regulatory capital 
ratio, measured as Tier 1 plus Tier 2 divided by risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet exposures 
(regcap). Tier 1 capital is the sum of shareholders’ funds and perpetual, non-cumulative preference 
shares. Tier 2 capital is the sum of hybrid capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves, and valuation 
reserves.4 
Bankcontrolijt is a vector which describes bank portfolio characteristics. It includes measures of 
bank size proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets (Bank size) and by the growth rate of total 
assets (Growth assets). In relation to the total assets, we note that this variable may arguably increase 
or decrease bank stability and risk (Beck et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2017b). The growth rate measure 
reflects any expansion of a bank’s balance sheet during the current year (compared to the previous 
year). We also include the ratio of noninterest income to total operating income (Non-operating 
income) to reflect the bank’s business model and its tendency towards activity diversification. In 
                                                          
3 
Our regression methodology differs from Beck et al. (2013) and Abedifar et al. (2013) in two aspects: First, we study the 
overall effect (and not the marginal effect) of capital ratios on the performance of both commercial (CBDV) and Islamic 
banks (IBDV). Second, we examine whether the effect of capital and regulation is similar or different for both systems. In 
addition, interacting IBDV and CBDV with capital ratios allows us to test whether we have the same or different overall 
effect of capital ratios on the performance of each bank type.  
 
4
 All correlation coefficients are below 0.4. The Pearson correlation matrix is available from the authors upon request.   
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addition, we control for bank credit risk exposure using the ratio of net loans to assets (Bank credit 
exposure) and the ratio of fixed assets to assets (Tangibility) to control for the bank’s non-financing 
activities.  
Countrycontroljt is a vector of four macroeconomic variables commonly used in the banking 
literature (Abedifar et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2017a, b). It includes the GDP growth 
rate (GDP rate) and the GDP per capita (GDP per capita) to reflect any potential cyclical behavior of 
Basel regulation; the inflation rate (inflation) to capture a country’s general financial conditions; and 
the concentration ratio measured by the fraction of total assets of the three largest banks in each 
country to total banking sector assets (concentration). 𝐶𝐶 and 𝑌𝑦 represent country (country control) 
and year (year control) fixed effect dummy variables. 𝐶𝐶 and 𝑌𝑦 are included to mitigate any effect of 
omitted variables related to each country and year specifications as explained by Anginer and 
Demirgüç-Kunt (2014). Finally, we follow Bitar et al. (2017b) and cluster at the bank level instead of 
the country level for two reasons. First, some countries have a much larger number of observations 
than other countries in the sample. Second, we have thirty three countries. Therefore, clustering at the 
country level might create biased results. 
In Eq. (2), we add RegIns to study the effect of regulatory capital along with regulatory 
environment on the performance of conventional and Islamic banks. RegIns includes six variables 
pertaining to the effect of bank regulation, supervision, and market monitoring on the association 
between regulatory capital and bank profitability. We use an index of capital stringency (CS), which 
measures the overall compliance of each country’s banking system with the Basel capital guidelines. 
We concentrate on information availability and transparency and use three indicators to examine their 
impact on the capital-performance relationship. The first measure is information disclosure 
(disclosure), which reflects the transparency and informativeness of bank financial statements. 
Second, we employ two measures of information transparency. The audit variable examines whether 
an external audit, i.e. a licensed (audit) or certified audit (certified), is required by regulatory 
authorities to examine bank financial statements (Shehzad and De Haan, 2015). In addition, we use a 
variable to control for entry restrictions in terms of obtaining a banking license (entry) and a dummy 
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variable that takes on a value of 1 if a country has an explicit deposit insurance scheme and 0 
otherwise (insurance). For all these variables, higher values indicate stronger and more stringent 
regulatory environment.  Finally, we introduce two dummy variables to distinguish between 
conventional and Islamic banks. IBDV is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for Islamic 
banks and 0 for conventional banks while CBDV is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for 
conventional banks and 0 for Islamic banks.  
3.3. Empirical measures of cultural values 
In this study, we examine whether cultural values can influence the association between 
regulatory capital, regulatory environment, and bank performance. In addition, we investigate whether 
cultural values can explain differences in the effect of regulation on the performance of Islamic banks 
compared to their conventional peers.  
Culture is often seen as intangible, complex, and difficult to assess and track (PWC, 2014). 
While there are various ways to proxy for culture, Karolyi (2016) refers to the Hofstede framework as 
one of the most comprehensive frameworks of cultural values. The World Values Surveys (WVS) are 
also important and are validated by their cumulative use and their impact in the recent business and 
finance literature (Eun et al. 2015; Ahern et al. 2015; Fongáčová et al., 2017; Lim et al., 2018).  
Karolyi (2016) qualifies the WVS as “a rich and valuable tool” to measure cultural values. In our 
analysis, we use both the Hofstede and the WVS for our main analysis and the Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project proxies in the robustness checks.  
Hofstede’s proxies for cultural values were created based on the survey of 117,000 IBM 
employees in 70 countries around the globe between 1967 and 1973. The survey included 60 core 
questions and 66 recommended questions. After employing a factor analysis to filter the answers into 
indexes, the Hofstede original framework included four dimensions (i.e. individualism-collectivism, 
uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity-femininity). In addition, two more dimensions 
were included: the short-long term orientation (Hofstede, 1991) and indulgence-self-restraint 
(Hofstede, 2010).  
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Despite the popular use of the Hofstede framework, critics have emphasized that there are 
several drawbacks. For instance, Ailon (2008) argues that Hofstede’s dimensions have a political 
subtext by attributing a greater importance to western values and misrepresent the rest of the world.5 
Karolyi (2016) also criticizes the over-reliance on theoretical (over purely statistical) constructs; he 
argues that Hofstede’s dimensions do not necessarily represent individuals’ personalities. Finally, 
Hofstede’s dimensions are often criticized because they are largely time-invariant. To understand the 
logic behind categorizing culture as time-invariant we refer to Boubakri and Saffar (2016) who 
distinguish between formal institutions (defined as the political, legal, and regulating structures) and 
informal institutions (that consist of cultural values, preferences, and norms). North (1991) states 
“although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, informal 
constraints embodied in customs, traditions and codes of conduct are much more impervious to 
deliberate policies.” In addition, Williamson (2000) argues that values and beliefs of individuals are 
very slow to change, on the order of 100–1000 years. Hofstede et al. (2010) also confirm that cultural 
values are as likely to change as a country’s weather or geographical position. From Hofstede, we use 
two cultural dimensions: individualism and masculinity. Both measures have values between 0 and 
100, with higher values indicating a more individualistic and more masculine society. 
From the WVS, we use a general measure of trust. The WVS were initially developed as 
exclusively European Values Surveys and grew into a WVS association (Karolyi, 2016). The WVS 
are engineered based on representative samples of more than 100,000 individuals from 100 countries 
(in the most recent 2012 survey) to respond to 250 survey questions on life perception, the 
environment, work, politics and society, security, science, and national identity (Karolyi, 2016). The 
survey question related to our trust measure is worded as follows: “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful on dealing with people?” Two 
answers are provided: (1) “Most people can be trusted” and (0) “You can’t be too careful”.   
                                                          
5 According to Ailon (2008), the oriental culture and the rest of the world, or the “rest”, are “systemically subjected to 
representational strategies that devaluate them and exclude their voices”. In addition, Ailon (2008) quotes from Westwood 
(2004) to describe Hofstede’s cultural methods as “reductionist” and “incorporating simplifying representational strategies 
that do violence to the inherent complexity of the social systems they pretend to represent”.   
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In a first step, for each of the three cultural measures, we use Eqs. (1)–(2) and run regressions on 
the full sample without taking into consideration countries’ classification according to their cultural 
values. This first regression enables us to respond to our first and baseline hypothesis (i.e whether the 
effect of capital and regulatory environment is more pronounced on the performance of conventional 
banks than on the performance of Islamic banks. Then, in a second step, we breakdown the full 
sample into various subsamples, depending on country cultural values. We classify countries as 
follows:  (1) highly individualistic, highly masculine, and highly trustful countries (if the countries’ 
proxy for the cultural measure > median of the respective measure) and (2) less individualistic, less 
masculine, and less trustful countries (if the countries’ proxy for the cultural measure <= median of 
the respective measure). We run the regressions using Eqs. (1)–(2) as well. This enables us to respond 
to the rest of our hypotheses (whether cultural values can affect the regulation-performance link 
between the two bank types). Full variable definitions and sources are provided in Appendix A’s 
Table A.1. 
INSERT TABLE [5] AROUND HERE 
3.4. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our samples of conventional and Islamic banks. Panels 
A and B present the mean, median, and standard deviation for the bank-level dependent and 
independent variables, while Panels C and D present the summary statistics for our key regulatory 
environment variables (i.e., capital stringency, information disclosure, licensed and certified auditors, 
entry requirements, and deposit insurance) and the rest of the macroeconomic control variables. 
Finally, Panel E presents the summary statistics for the cultural values control variables.   
In Panels A and B, we also report the outcomes of a Wilks’ lambda test (λ) , a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test (Wilc), and a univariate analysis of variance test (F) for the equality of means for each 
financial ratio. The results of the statistical tests are presented in the last three columns of each panel 
and suggest that conventional banks are significantly different from Islamic banks with respect to all 
the financial ratios (except for the return on average assets and the bank credit exposure). The three 
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tests demonstrate that the most significant differences between the two bank types relates to the 
measure of Tier 1 capital, with Islamic banks showing greater capitalization.  
The mean of the individualism, masculinity, and trust cultural values are 42.3%, 54.57%, and 
2.44 respectively (Panel E). We notice that the United Kingdom has the highest cultural values in term 
individualism and masculinity while Saudi Arabia has the most trustful culture. In contrast, we find 
that several countries share the lowest cultural values: Indonesia is the least individualistic with 14%, 
Iran is the least masculine with 43%, and Philippines is the least trustful with 0.51. 
4. Main findings 
In this section, we examine the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment on the 
profitability of conventional and Islamic banks. We also study the effect of culture on the link 
between capital, regulation, and bank profitability for the two bank types. These results can be useful 
as an input for both banks and regulators. Specifically, if the main channel through which capital 
along with a strong regulatory environment improves bank profitability is by forging the most 
appropriate cultural values, then it makes sense to both banks and regulators to work together to 
provide an appropriate framework for a successful banking culture. This includes promoting a culture 
based on team work, collaboration, equality between genders, and trust between employees, 
immediate supervisors, and upper management. We argue that using culture to fill regulatory and 
supervisory gaps as a solution to improve bank profitability has merits, given years of repeated 
failures in trying to find the most accurate regulatory guidelines. We find empirical evidence in 
support of the role of culture in improving the impact of capital and regulation on the profitability of 
the two bank types.  
Our first set of results are presented in Table 2. The findings in Models 1 and 2 suggest that 
regulatory capital has a positive impact on the profitability of the two bank types, although the impact 
is less pronounced on the profitability of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. As for the 
impact of the institutional environment, Models 3 to 8 show that the capital-profitability relationship 
is positive and significant at the five percent level or above for conventional banks operating in 
countries with more capital stringency, transparency and information disclosures, stronger entry 
16 
  
requirements, and deposit insurance schemes. As for Islamic banks, a strong institutional environment 
appears to have either a marginal or insignificant effect on the link between capital and profitability. 
The findings concur with the results of previous literature, which provided empirical evidence on the 
less effective role of regulatory environment on the performance of Islamic banks (Zins and Weill, 
2017; Bitar et al. 2017b; Bitar et al. 2018), thus supporting our first hypothesis. 
INSERT TABLE [2] AROUND HERE 
Now, we ask whether there are ways for bankers and regulators to improve the effect of 
regulatory capital and regulatory environment on the profitability of conventional and Islamic banks. 
Our second and more important set of results provides evidence that the capital, regulatory 
environment, and bank profitability relationship can be enhanced depending on the existing culture in 
three ways. Specifically, we show that three types of cultural values display important effects on the 
capital, regulation, and profitability link. For instance, in countries that are highly individualistic and 
highly masculine, both regulatory capital and regulatory environment have a less pronounced effect 
on bank performance, while high-trust countries experience a more pronounced effect. The following 
paragraphs discuss the quantitative results in greater detail. 
First, the empirical results for the effect of individualism on the link between capital, regulation, 
and bank profitability are reported in Table 3. We find that the effect of capital and regulation on bank 
profitability is more pronounced in countries with less individualistic cultural values, as reflected in 
the positive coefficients on the profitability of conventional banks (Islamic banks) at the 1 percent 
level (5 percent level or higher) for all specifications, thus confirming our second hypothesis. Banks in 
highly individualistic countries tend to maximize their own benefits through aggressive competition 
and risk-taking. Individual gain is the key measure of success regardless of the tools used to achieve 
it. Government and regulation are considered as barriers to success and individual achievement. This 
can explain the less effective role of capital and regulation in improving bank profitability in countries 
with cultural values oriented toward individualism. In contrast, we find that cultural values that 
accommodate collaboration, solidarity, and team effort between employers and employees can indeed 
enhance the effect of capital and regulation on profitability for both conventional and Islamic banks. 
Promoting equality and collective action towards society can create a better environment for 
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regulators to integrate a successful regulatory framework aligning both regulators’ and bankers’ 
objectives towards improving bank performance.  
INSERT TABLE [3] AROUND HERE 
Second, the empirical results for the effect of masculinity on the link between capital, regulation 
and bank profitability are presented in Table 4. We find that the effect of regulatory capital and 
regulatory environment on bank profitability is more pronounced in countries with less masculine 
cultural values, as reflected in the positive coefficients on the profitability of conventional banks 
(Islamic banks) at the 1 percent level (5 percent level or higher) for all specifications, thus confirming 
our third hypothesis. As such, similar to the case of highly individualistic countries, cultural values 
oriented toward masculinity by focusing on profits as the only way to measure success, risk-taking, 
and the use of force to achieve goals and solve conflicts can be harmful and thus weaken the effect of 
capital and regulatory environment on the two bank types’ profitability. In contrast, we find that 
cultural values that promote equality between genders and communication and negotiation to solve 
conflicts can enhance the effect of capital and regulation on profitability for both conventional and 
Islamic banks. Referring to qualifications to choose the proper individuals for higher administrative 
positions and accepting failure as a part of the learning process can create a better adapted 
environment for regulators to integrate a successful regulatory framework aligning both regulators’ 
and bankers’ objectives towards improving bank performance.  
INSERT TABLE [4] AROUND HERE 
Third, the empirical results on the effect of trust on the link between capital, regulation, and 
bank profitability are displayed in Table 5. We find that the effect of capital and regulatory 
environment on bank profitability is more pronounced in countries with high-trust cultural values, as 
indicated by the positive coefficients on the profitability of conventional banks at the one percent level 
for all specifications, thus confirming our fourth hypothesis. In highly trustful countries, economic 
and financial transactions are conducted with lower transaction costs, information is transparent and 
available to the public, and people have more confidence in the work accomplished by the regulatory 
and supervisory authorities. As such, people might have more confidence in the financial system not 
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only because they trust the job done by regulators, but also because they believe that high-trust 
cultural values dominate the internal banking culture between employees and employers and between 
the bank and its customers.  
INSERT TABLE [5] AROUND HERE 
Finally, Tables 3 to 5 show that the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment on 
conventional bank profitability is significantly different compared to that of Islamic banks in countries 
with culture values that are less trustful, more individualistic, and more masculine, as reflected in the 
highly significant Wald tests. While Zins and Weill (2017), Bitar et al. (2017b), and Bitar et al. 
(2017c) conclude that regulation enlarges the risk and efficiency gaps between the two bank types at 
the expense of Islamic banks, our study adds to the debate by showing that cultural values are also 
important. Precisely, our results show that in less trustful countries with cultural values oriented to 
individualism and masculinity, regulation can have an even more detrimental effect on the 
performance of Islamic banks compared to that of conventional ones, as reflected in the negative 
impact of regulation on their profitability ratios. However, and more importantly, regulation can 
enhance the profitability of Islamic banks and reduce the performance gap with their conventional 
counterparts in more trustful countries with cultural values that focus on collective efforts, 
communication, and equality between genders.  
5. Robustness tests  
Our results so far indicate that the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment is 
positively associated with the profitability of conventional banks while the same effect appears to be 
marginal or insignificant on the profitability of Islamic banks. In addition, we show that the capital, 
regulation, and profitability link is stronger for the two bank types in more trustful countries with 
cultural values that are less individualistic and less masculine. In this section, we test the robustness of 
our results using alternative dependent and independent variables, alternative cultural measures, and 
three other estimation techniques.    
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5.1. Alternative profitability and capital measures 
We now report a robustness analysis of the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory 
environment on bank profitability. Specifically, we use alternative measures of bank profitability and 
capital focusing on operating profits and capital of good quality. Operating profits (i.e. the ratio of 
operating profits divided by total assets, opata) compares the efficiency and operational performance 
of banks as it looks at the operational returns generated from assets (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Bitar et 
al. 2017a). Regulatory capital is replaced by Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (t1r) because it 
captures the quality of a bank’s capital as represented by its common equity. Arnold et al. (2012) and 
Anginer et al. (2014) find that Tier 1 capital is more effective in absorbing losses during the financial 
crisis. As before, we run the regression specified in Eqs. (1)–(2) and include bank and country level 
control variables and the interactions between Tier 1 capital and regulatory environment. Table 6 
reports the results. We only report the interaction terms to save space. The results confirm our 
previous findings. Regulatory capital and regulatory environment are positively associated with the 
operating profits of conventional and Islamic banks in countries with cultural values that are more 
trustful, less individualistic, and less masculine. The effect is more pronounced on the profitability of 
conventional banks than on Islamic ones. In addition, the effect of regulatory capital and regulatory 
environment on conventional bank profitability is significantly different compared to that of Islamic 
banks in countries with cultural values that are less trustful, more individualistic, and more masculine, 
as reflected in the highly significant Wald tests. 
INSERT TABLE [6] AROUND HERE 
We also use higher cutting points for cultural values. Precisely, we break down the sample into 
two subsamples: (1) highly individualistic, highly masculine, and highly trustful (if the country’s 
proxy for the cultural measure > upper quantile of the respective measure) and (2) less individualistic, 
less masculine, and less trustful (if the country’s proxy for the cultural measure <= upper quantile of 
the respective measure). We also use Eqs. (1)–(2) and present the results in Table 7. We only report 
the interaction terms to save space. The results remain unchanged and are not driven by higher cutting 
points.  
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  INSERT TABLE [7] AROUND HERE 
5.2. Alternative cultural measures  
In this section, we address concerns in the literature about the validity of our measures of 
cultural values. Ahern et al. (2015) argue that the use of national survey data could involve biases 
when studying the culture-finance link in at least three important ways: The first source of potential 
bias can arise if survey responses are poor proxies for actual cultural values. However, they find that 
the literature provides evidence that survey-based measures of culture are good predictors of actual 
values. The second source of potential bias can be related to the fact that cultural values might not be 
directly related to economic choices. However, the literature also provides robust evidence of a strong 
association between cultural values and economic preferences. Finally, a third potential source of bias 
could arise if the registered cultural values did not reflect the actual cultural values of the surveyed 
individuals. While Ahern et al. (2015) refer to various databases to validate the appropriateness of 
their proxies, in this study we use alternative proxies. Karolyi (2016) provides a critical assessment of 
the key databases used to measure cultural values. While Hofstede and the WVS databases have been 
extensively used in the finance literature, one database that has been underutilized in the finance 
literature is the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project 
developed by Professor Robert House (from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania) to 
understand changes in cultural values. The GLOBE project involves survey questionnaires conducted 
on more than 17,300 executives in 951 organizations across 62 countries. Similar to Hofstede’s 
measures, the GLOBE project categorizes culture into nine dimensions, but it distinguishes between 
actual societies’ practices “as is” and values as they “should be” for the different cultural values. By 
referring to the GLOBE project, we use institutional collectivism values (the extent to which 
organizational and societal institutional values encourage and reward collective actions, regulation, 
and supervision to promote equality and improve performance) to replace individualism. We also use 
gender egalitarianism (the extent to which a country seeks to minimize gender inequality and 
encourage higher education and communication to solve conflicts) to replace masculinity. Finally, we 
refer to the World Values Surveys and use a measure of confidence in government (the extent to 
which people have confidence in decisions made by their government) to replace general trust. The 
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findings are presented in Table 8. We report only the interaction terms to save space. These findings 
suggest that regulatory capital and regulatory environment have a more pronounced effect on the 
profitability of conventional and Islamic banks in countries with cultural values oriented to 
institutional collectivism, gender egalitarianism, and higher level of confidence in governments, thus 
confirming our previous findings. We also use in-group collectivism practices, gender egalitarianism 
practices from the GLOBE project, and confidence in major corporations from the World Values 
Surveys as a second alternative of cultural values. The results remain highly robust and are available 
upon request.   
  INSERT TABLE [8] AROUND HERE 
5.3. Endogeneity concerns 
The results presented in the preceding sections provide evidence that regulatory capital and 
regulatory environment can positively affect the profitability of conventional banks while the same 
effect is either marginal or insignificant for Islamic banks. However, one might argue that this effect 
might be the result of endogeneity. Endogeneity can result from three sources: unobservable 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity. First, unobservable heterogeneity is a source of 
endogeneity if unobservable variables are correlated with bank profitability, capital, and regulatory 
variables. In other words, the decision to hold higher regulatory capital can be associated with various 
bank characteristics. Some of these characteristics are unobservable. For example, bank size (e.g. 
considering a financial institution as too big to fail) can affect bank profitability and may thus affect 
manager decision to reduce or increase regulatory capital (Schaeck and Cihák, 2013). Second, 
simultaneity refers to the reverse causality between profitability and bank regulatory capital. While 
holding higher regulatory capital can influence bank profitability, the literature also suggests that 
regulators are often more flexible with more profitable and efficient banks in terms of their minimum 
capital requirements (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Finally, dynamic endogeneity refers to the lagged 
reversed causality between performance and bank capital. The bank decision to hold higher capital 
ratios may indeed be a function of past performance. For instance, in periods of economic growth, 
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banks may decide to increase their retained earnings to protect against any future distress, which can 
be reflected in higher capital buffers.  
Thus, a simple multivariate regression of the impact of capital and regulatory environment on 
bank performance may result in biased estimates because of these endogeneity issues. Introducing 
past performance in the list of exogenous variables only partially resolves the dynamic endogeneity 
issue while ignoring the unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity issues. To address unobservable 
heterogeneity, the literature often includes fixed effects in the regression models. However, there are 
two main issues with fixed-effect regressions. First, time-invariant binary variables like Islamic and 
conventional bank dummy variables cannot be estimated with fixed effects (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; 
Bitar et al. 2017a, b). Second, the regulatory environment variables do not vary much over time and 
hence applying fixed-effect estimations would generate an important loss of the degrees of freedom 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015). As a result, we follow Bennouri et al. (2018) and use a two-step system 
generalized method of moments (GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 6  
The system GMM approach allows the relationship between regulatory capital and bank 
performance to be estimated in levels and first differences simultaneously. The level equation presents 
performance as a function of its past values (lagged values), observable bank characteristics 
(regulatory capital, regulatory environment, and the rest of the exogenous variables), and the error 
term, including a fixed-effect component. The difference equation presents year-to-year differences in 
the level equation. Accordingly, the difference equation presents the changes in year-to-year 
performance as a function of the year-to-year lagged changes in performance, year-to-year change of 
the exogenous variables, and the difference in error terms. Note that the fixed-effect error term 
disappears in the difference equation, since it is by definition time-invariant. By estimating these 
equations simultaneously, the system GMM approach controls for heterogeneous endogeneity 
(stemming from time-invariant variables) and includes the dynamic structure of the relationship 
                                                          
6 The use of dynamic panel data by employing system GMM as a strong tool to control for endogeneity has been brought to 
our attention thankfully by one of the referees. In the internet appendix, we also use an instrumental variable (IV) approach 
based on a two-square least squares regression (2SLS) technique. The findings are very similar to those provided by the 
system GMM.    
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between performance and bank capital and regulatory environment. The rationale of using past 
performance and differences in explanatory variables as instruments is based on the fact that the bank 
decision to increase regulatory capital can be related to current and past performance in addition to 
other bank characteristics (e.g. bank size, credit risk exposure, etc.). If current performance is 
observed, the unanticipated component of performance (i.e. the error term in the regression) can be 
assumed to be uncorrelated with past observations of the endogenous variables (regulatory capital, 
regulatory environment, and the rest of the bank characteristics) when observation of lags goes 
sufficiently far back in time. While both conventional and Islamic banking literature is largely silent 
about endogeneity concerns, we argue that legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and durability of the 
political system can be the candidates for this third factor.7 Data on legal origins is combined based on 
collected information from the CIA’s world fact-book while data on ethnic fractionalization and 
durability of the political system is collected from La porta et al. (2006) and the Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions of Polity IV project. The impact of legal origins and political systems 
on bank profitability and capital has been documented in several recent studies. Banks in a country 
with a hybrid or a Sharia’a-based legal origin tend to be more efficient and more profitable (Bitar et 
al. 2017). In addition, Islamic banks tend to be more capitalized in countries with more durable 
political systems (Bitar et al., 2017). Finally, we borrow from Barth et al. (2013) and use ethnic 
fractionalization as a third instrument.  
We carry out two tests to check the identification of the model and to examine the validity of the 
instruments. First, the Sargan test checks whether the model is overidentified. For our study, the null 
hypothesis of overidentified model is rejected in all regressions. Second, the Hansen test of 
exogeneity of the instruments used does not lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of valid 
(exogenous) instruments. These tests further confirm the validity of the GMM approach.  
                                                          
7 The legal origins index takes a value of zero for countries that rely completely on western legal systems and do not recognise 
Sharia’a law in their legal systems. The legal origins index takes a value of one for countries that have mixed legal systems 
that are based on both Sharia’a law and western laws (such as common and civil laws). Finally, the index takes a value of 
two if Sharia’a law is the only recognised legal system.  For example, some countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan 
have adopted a version of a fully Sharia’a-compliant legal system, whereas countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey 
allow both legal systems to co-exist. Ethnic fractionalization is the average of five different indices of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. Durability of the political system is defined as the number of years since the most recent regime change or 
the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions.    
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The use of the system GMM approach requires testing autocorrelation to detect dynamic 
specification of the endogenous and dependent variables. For this purpose, we employ the Wooldridge 
(2002) test, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no auto-correlation. Table 9 and appendix 
Tables A.2 – A.4 present the results of the system GMM estimations and display the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) auto-correlation tests for all endogenous and exogenous variables. The null hypothesis of no 
first-order (AR(1)) auto-correlation is always rejected, which confirms the Wooldridge (2002) test 
results. The Arellano-Bond (1991) test, however, does not reject the null hypothesis of no second-
order serial correlation (AR(2)), thus supporting the use of the system GMM to strengthen the 
robustness of our results. These results provide clear evidence of a positive and significant (at the 1 
percent level) association between capital, regulatory environment, and the profitability of 
conventional banks while the effect is insignificant on the performance of Islamic banks. In addition, 
regulatory capital and regulatory environment have a more pronounced effect on the profitability of 
conventional banks in countries with cultural values that are less individualistic, less masculine, and 
highly trustful while the effect remains absent on the performance of Islamic banks. Finally, the F-test 
(Wald) for the degree of significance between capital ratios and regulatory environment coefficients 
on the profitability of conventional and Islamic banks continue to confirm our previous findings.  
INSERT TABLE [9] AROUND HERE 
5.4. Self-selection bias and matched samples 
We follow Bitar et al. (2017) and use a Heckman (1979) selection approach to correct for a 
potential self-selection bias. This technique helps to control for any bias in sample choice between 
highly capitalized banks and less capitalized ones. In the first step, we estimate a probit model that 
regresses a dummy variable – that takes on a value of one if the two bank types’ regulatory capital 
ratios have values greater than or equal to the median, and zero otherwise – on the three instruments 
used in the previous section (cf. legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and durability of the political 
system) in addition to bank- and country-level control variables. In the second stage regression, we 
use the profitability ratio as the dependent variable and use the capital and regulatory environment 
proxies as the independent variables completed with the same control variables and a self-selection 
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parameter (measured as the inverse Mills ratio) estimated from the first-stage regression. The results 
of the first-stage regressions show that the instruments are positively and significantly associated with 
bank profitability ratio. The results of the second-stage regressions are reported in Table 10 and 
continue to suggest that capital and regulatory environment are positively associated with profitability 
of conventional banks while the results remain insignificant for Islamic banks. The F-test (Wald) for 
the degree of significance confirms the significant different effect of capital and regulatory 
environment on the profitability of conventional banks compared to Islamic ones.   
INSERT TABLE [10] AROUND HERE   
We also employ a propensity score matching (PSM) technique proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Raubin (1983) to verify the robustness of our results. PSM consists of matching observations of banks 
based on the probability of increasing the two bank types’ capital ratios. The comparison between 
banks with higher capital ratios and banks with lower capital ratios are then compared for the matched 
sample.  
To implement PSM, we create a regulatory capital dummy variable that takes on a value of one 
if both bank types’ regulatory capital ratios have values greater than or equal to the median, and zero 
otherwise. We then estimate a logit model where we regress the bank regulatory capital dummy on all 
control variables in the baseline model and the year and the country fixed effects. We use the 
estimated scores to produce matched observations between banks with higher and lower capital ratios. 
Additionally, we employ four different matching methods: K-nearest neighbors with nearest neighbor 
n=3, n= 7, and n=10; 1-to-1 matching with no replacement; Gaussian Kernel matching; and Radius 
matching. In the matched samples (presented in Table 11), we continue to find evidence that both 
conventional and Islamic banks with higher regulatory capital ratios have higher profitability in 
countries that are less individualistic, less masculine, and more trustful than matched banks in less 
trustful countries with cultural values oriented to individualism and masculinity. For each matching 
method, we report T statistics for the differences between the treated banks with higher regulatory 
capital ratios and banks with lower regulatory capital ratios in the control group. For regulatory capital 
in countries that are highly individualistic, highly masculine, and highly trustful, the profitability 
differences between the treated and the control group vary between 0.069 and 1.252 percent. Except 
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in highly trustful countries, these differences are not statistically significant. For regulatory capital in 
countries that are less individualistic, less masculine, and less trustful, the profitability differences 
between the treated and the control group vary between 0.164 and 1.401 percent. These differences 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in almost all models, except for the differences in the 
sample of banks in less trustful countries, which are only highly significant when using the radius 
matching method.                    
INSERT TABLE [11] AROUND HERE 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates whether cultural values can influence the regulation-performance link of 
banks in countries with dual banking systems. The effect of regulatory capital and regulatory 
environment has been studied extensively in the conventional banking literature with mixed results. 
However, there are no papers investigating to what extent cultural values can influence the 
performance of conventional and Islamic banks. Our study aims to fill this gap in the literature using a 
sample of 729 banks operating in 33 countries and covering the period from 1999 to 2013.   
Employing these findings as a benchmark, we include different measures of formal and informal 
institutions in our empirical approach. We use regulatory capital and regulatory environment to 
represent formal institutions and different proxies of cultural values to represent informal institutions. 
The main findings show that regulatory capital and regulatory environment enhance the performance 
of conventional banks, while the effect is either marginal or insignificant on the performance of 
Islamic banks. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Zins and Weill, 2017; Bitar et al., 2017c), our 
findings support the view that capital adequacy ratio and regulatory environment enlarge the 
performance gap between the two bank types at the expense of Islamic banks. In addition, we find that 
the regulation-performance link is reinforced by the presence of the appropriate cultural values. We 
obtain two main results. First, cultural values that are less individualistic (oriented to collective action, 
e.g. focusing on team effort and group decisions where governmental regulation and supervision can 
improve the overall performance of the banking system), less masculine (oriented to egalitarianism, 
e.g. values related to education, qualification, gender equality, and communication) and highly trustful 
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(oriented to trust, e.g. focusing on reducing transaction costs and information asymmetries through 
requirements to disclose information as well as promoting confidence in the financial system by 
creating a deposit insurance scheme and proper regulation) strengthen the regulation-performance link 
for the two bank types. Finally, the larger profitability gap resulting from higher regulatory capital and 
regulatory environment appears to be driven by cultural values oriented to individualism, masculinity, 
and less trust.                
Our results have important policy implications. First, we show that applying a one size fits all 
regulation enlarges the performance gap between conventional and Islamic banks—a situation that 
could hamper the overall performance of banks in countries with dual banking systems. Second, 
cultural values can influence the regulation-performance link of the two bank types via three main 
channels: Individualism, masculinity, and trust. We argue that using culture to enhance the effect of 
regulation to improve bank performance has merits, given years of repeated failures in determining 
the most accurate regulatory guidelines. Finally, we find that cultural values can play an important 
role in reducing the performance gap between the two bank types. This paper is a first initiative to 
provide empirical evidence on the importance of cultural values as an additional tool to implement 
regulatory guidelines in a successful way.  
It is worth noting that the overall significance and interpretation of our results depend largely on 
the validity of the measures used to proxy for formal and informal institutions as well as bank 
performance. We attempt to overcome potential limitations related to measurement errors by 
employing alternative measures of cultural values and bank performance as well as using various 
econometric approaches (system GMM, Heckman estimation, propensity score matching techniques, 
etc.). However, more research is required to draw definitive conclusions about the appropriate cultural 
values that should be implemented in banking institutions to improve the regulation-performance link. 
An extension of our analysis that would add to our understanding of cultural values and the 
regulation-performance link is to consider bank internal corporate culture along with informal 
institutions. Bennouri et al. (2018) point out that gender diversity and the presence of female directors 
significantly increase firm performance. It will be interesting to explore to what extent informal 
cultural values can influence the internal corporate culture-performance link not only for banks in dual 
28 
  
banking systems but also for banks at the international level. For instance, how do the attributes of 
board members (i.e. gender diversity factors such as members’ nationalities, fraction of women on 
boards, women in the CEO position, etc.) change across different cultural values? Which cultural 
values are more adequate for banks to enhance the internal corporate governance and performance 
link? The current literature is generally interested in studying either the effect of internal corporate 
governance or the effect of informal institutions on bank performance. At this stage, constraints in 
finding the appropriate measures of cultural values as well as a representative sample to proxy for the 
attributes of bank board members makes these research questions important candidates for future 
research avenues.   
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Tables  
Table 1  
Summary statistics for variables 
 Conventional banks (CBs)   Islamic banks (IBs)  Test statistics  
Variables N Mean Median SD  N Mean Median SD  Wilks-λ Wilc F 
Panel A. Dependent variables 
Return on average assets (ROAA) 6,951 1.12 1.12 1.98  1,371 1.21 1.1 4.17  0.9998 -1.388 1.46 
Operating profits (OPATA) 5,627 1.48 1.40 2.3  1,090 1.88 1.47 3.43  0.9967*** -2.264*** 22.36*** 
Panel B. Bank control variables 
Regulatory capital 4,130 20.2 16.79 10.06  858 26.23 18.2 20.2  0.9674*** -4.755*** 167.86*** 
Tier 1 capital 2,930 16.81 14.26 8.81  753 24.31 16.64 19.01  0.9367*** -9.116*** 249.26*** 
Bank size 7,024 13.99 13.86 2.07  1,375 13.75 13.76 1.76  0.9979*** 3.373*** 17.3*** 
Bank credit exposure 6,952 48.86 50.62 22.61  1,328 47.78 51.82 24.66  0.9997 0.665 2.46 
Tangibility  6,799 1.85 1.15 2.24  1,340 2.75 1.77 3.16  0.9815*** -10.53*** 153.79*** 
Non-operating income 6,850 64 66.82 21.77  1,343 58.34 66.35 29.82  0.9919*** 3.423*** 66.53***  
Growth assets 6,430 16.59 11.9 28.36  1,217 27.05 19.85 36.6  0.9838 -12.305*** 125.67*** 
Panel C. Regulatory environment control variables (full sample) 
 N Mean Median SD          
Capital stringency (stringent) 33 5.83 6 1.26          
Information disclosure (disclosure) 33 2.06 2 0.55          
Licensed audit (audit) 33 1.93 2 0.29          
Certified audit (certified) 33 0.99 1 0.09          
Entry requirements (entry) 33 7.74 8 0.59          
Deposit insurance (insurance) 33 0.75 1 0.43          
Panel D. Macroeconomic control variables (full sample  
GDP rate  33 4.14 4.3 3.96          
GDP per capita 33 8.47 8.35 1.51          
Inflation 33 7.77 3.99 14.38          
Concentration  33 73.62 72.56 15.56          
Panel E. Cultural values across countries  
Country  Individualism Masculinity Trust Country  Individualism Masculinity Trust 
Albania . . . Malaysia 26 50 0.87 
Algeria 38 53 3.35 Mauritania 38 53 . 
Bahrain 38 53 . Pakistan 14 50 2.51 
Bangladesh 20 55 2.33 Palestinian territories 38 53 1.58 
Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . Philippines 32 64 0.51 
Brunei Darussalam . . . Qatar 38 53 5.05 
Cayman Islands . . . Saudi Arabia 38 53 5.05 
Egypt 38 53 2.69 Senegal . . . 
Gambia . . . South Africa 20 48 2.41 
Indonesia 14 46 4.08 Sudan 38 53 . 
Iraq 38 53 . Syria Arab Republic 38 53 . 
Iran 41 43 . Tunisia 38 53 . 
Jordan 38 53 2.23 Turkey 37 45 0.99 
Kenya 27 49 . United Arab Emirates 38 53 . 
Kuwait 38 53 2.85 United Kingdom 89 66 3.27 
Lebanon 38 53 0.98 Yemen 38 53 . 
    Mean (total) 42.3 54.57 2.44 
Notes: The sample consists of 729 banks in 33 countries for the 1999 – 2013 period. 
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Table 2 
The effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment on bank performance  
 Regulatory capital  Regulatory capital and regulatory environment   
 All banks Separate   Separate      
 
Model # 
ROAA 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
 ROAA 
 (3) 
ROAA 
 (4) 
ROAA 
 (5) 
ROAA 
 (6) 
ROAA 
 (7) 
ROAA 
 (8) 
Bank size 0.132*** 
(0.041) 
0.131*** 
(0.041) 
 0.137*** 
(0.043) 
0.201*** 
(0.053) 
0.138*** 
(0.043) 
0.145*** 
(0.042) 
0.149*** 
(0.043) 
0.119*** 
(0.043) 
Bank credit exposure 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
 0.014** 
(0.005) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
Tangibility  -0.155*** 
(0.052) 
-0.154*** 
(0.050) 
 -0.161*** 
(0.08) 
-0.220** 
(0.088) 
-0.176*** 
(0.056) 
-0.175*** 
(0.056) 
-0.177*** 
(0.056) 
-0.169*** 
(0.055) 
Non-operating income -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
 -0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
Growth assets 0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Regulatory capital 0.042*** 
(0.009) 
        
Regulatory capital × Islamic  0.029** 
(0.013) 
       
Regulatory capital × 
Conventional 
 0.053*** 
(0.007) 
       
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
Capital stringency (CS) 
   0.004* 
(0.002) 
     
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× Capital stringency (CS) 
   0.008*** 
(0.001) 
     
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
Disclosure 
    0.01 
(0.009) 
    
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× Disclosure 
    0.027*** 
(0.005) 
    
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
Audit 
     0.012* 
(0.007) 
   
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× Audit 
     0.024*** 
(0.004) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
Certified 
      0.025* 
(0.015) 
  
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× Certified 
      0.051*** 
(0.008) 
  
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
Entry 
       0.004* 
(0.002) 
 
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× Entry 
       0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
        0.019 
(0.018) 
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× insurance 
        0.049*** 
(0.008) 
GDP rate  0.022* 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
 0.044*** 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
0.037** 
(0.015) 
0.036** 
(0.015) 
0.036** 
(0.015) 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
GDP per capita 1.057*** 
(0.275) 
0.995*** 
(0.278) 
 0.873** 
(0.378) 
0.740 
(0.456) 
0.905** 
(0.369) 
1.063*** 
(0.372) 
0.908** 
(0.369) 
0.928** 
(0.373) 
Inflation -0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
 -0.032 
(0.020) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
-0.032* 
(0.019) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
-0.038** 
(0.019) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
Concentration  -0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.012) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.029*** 
(0.008) 
-0.034*** 
(0.009) 
Constant -5.711** 
(2.401) 
-5.822** 
(2.399) 
 -6.812 
(4.433) 
-5.443 
(5.350) 
-8.796*** 
(3.293) 
-9.955*** 
(3.339) 
-7.09* 
(4.279) 
-7.388** 
(3.305) 
Observations 3,371 3,371  2,708 1,973 2,756 2,756 2,754 2,756 
Country control Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year control Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2  4.63**  2.74* 4.73** 3.75* 4.41** 4.29** 3.62* 
R2 0.203 0.211  0.192 0.199 0.192 0.197 0.198 0.193 
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.144  0.121 0.127 0.121 0.126 0.127 0.121 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 
scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit 
(audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions 
with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** 
denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3 
The effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment on bank performance: High vs. low individualism    
 Baseline and individualism     Institutional environment and individualism (High vs. low individualism)         
 All banks  Separate   Separate            
 High Low High Low  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Model # ROAA 
 (1) 
ROAA 
 (2) 
ROAA 
 (3) 
ROAA 
 (4) 
 ROAA 
 (5) 
ROAA 
 (6) 
ROAA 
 (7) 
ROAA 
 (8) 
ROAA 
 (9) 
ROAA 
 (10) 
ROAA 
 (11) 
ROAA 
 (12) 
ROAA 
 (13) 
ROAA 
 (14) 
ROAA 
 (15) 
ROAA 
 (16) 
Bank size -0.074 
(0.053) 
0.186*** 
(0.055) 
-0.028 
(0.039) 
0.185*** 
(0.055) 
 -0.026 
(0.041) 
0.215*** 
(0.059) 
-0.03 
(0.039) 
0.255*** 
(0.061) 
-0.03 
(0.039) 
0.22*** 
(0.059) 
-0.028 
(0.039) 
0.233*** 
(0.059) 
-0.027 
(0.038) 
0.236*** 
(0.060) 
-0.043 
(0.039) 
0.191*** 
(0.059) 
Bank credit exposure 0.009 
(0.008) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
Tangibility  -0.113 
(0.230) 
-0.158** 
(0.062) 
0.085 
(0.166) 
-0.155** 
(0.061) 
 0.1 
(0.167) 
-0.18** 
(0.073) 
0.0627 
(0.164) 
-0.203*** 
(0.073) 
0.083 
(0.166) 
-0.193*** 
(0.069) 
0.085 
(0.166) 
-0.192*** 
(0.069) 
0.085 
(0.166) 
-0.193*** 
(0.069) 
0.016 
(0.168) 
-0.184*** 
(0.069) 
Non-operating income -0.016** 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
 -0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Growth assets 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
Regulatory capital -0.013 
(0.026) 
0.049*** 
(0.009) 
               
Regulatory capital × Islamic   -0.072*** 
(0.023) 
0.039*** 
(0.013) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Conventional 
  0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.057*** 
(0.008) 
             
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× stringency 
     -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × stringency  
     0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
          
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Disclosure 
       -0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Disclosure 
       0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
        
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Audit 
         -0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Audit 
         0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
      
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Certified 
           -0.07*** 
(0.023) 
0.038** 
(0.015) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Certified 
           0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.057*** 
(0.009) 
    
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Entry requirements  
             -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Entry  
             0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
  
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× insurance  
               -0.078*** 
(0.022) 
0.033* 
(0.019) 
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × insurance 
               0.025** 
(0.009) 
0.054*** 
(0.009) 
GDP rate  0.265 
(0.308) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.274 
(0.290) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
 0.251 
(0.291) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.336 
(0.293) 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
0.261 
(0.292) 
0.034* 
(0.017) 
0.274 
(0.290) 
0.033* 
(0.017) 
0.261 
(0.288) 
0.034* 
(0.018) 
0.325 
(0.291) 
0.043** 
(0.018) 
GDP per capita 1.875 
(2.201) 
1.306*** 
(0.324) 
2.024 
(1.975) 
1.246*** 
(0.327) 
 1.870 
(1.964) 
1.35** 
(0.550) 
2.168 
(1.994) 
1.579*** 
(0.527) 
2.178 
(1.992) 
1.33** 
(0.533) 
2.024 
(1.975) 
1.62*** 
(0.533) 
1.982 
(1.968) 
1.381*** 
(0.531) 
2.613 
(2.068) 
1.477*** 
(0.542) 
Inflation 0.147 
(0.114) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
0.162 
(0.100) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
 0.158 
(0.010) 
-0.032 
(0.020) 
0.15 
(0.101) 
-0.042** 
(0.019) 
0.177* 
(0.103) 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
0.162 
(0.100) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.163 
(0.100) 
-0.038** 
(0.019) 
2.613 
(2.068) 
1.477*** 
(0.542) 
Concentration  -0.005 
(0.047) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
 0.01 
(0.045) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.045) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.018 
(0.045) 
-0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.023** 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.024 
(0.045) 
-0.033*** 
(0.010) 
Constant -17.20 
(27.33) 
-9.04*** 
(2.888) 
-22.66 
(24.84) 
-9.079*** 
(2.890) 
 -20.84 
(24.79) 
-13.62*** 
(4.714) 
-24.17 
(25.01) 
-15.5*** 
(4.558) 
-24.62 
(25.07) 
-8.187** 
(3.954) 
-22.66 
(24.84) 
-9.761** 
(4.000) 
-22.26 
(24.76) 
-14.15** 
(5.969) 
-29.28 
(25.80) 
-7.355* 
(4.036) 
Observations 333 2,900 333 2,900  333 2,271 333 2,204 333 2,319 333 2,319 333 2,317 333 2,319 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2   22.63*** 2.8*  19.48*** 1.01 24.31*** 1.79 22.21*** 1.69 22.63*** 2.23 22.91*** 2.13 22.89*** 1.59 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.327 0.196 0.517 0.201  0.514 0.184 0.514 0.201 0.515 0.186 0.517 0.193 0.518 0.194 0.505 0.186 
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.123 0.356 0.127  0.352 0.102 0.352 0.118 0.354 0.105 0.356 0.112 0.357 0.113 0.339 0.104 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using 
capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). In models (1)-(16), we breakdown the sample into 
two subsamples: (1) highly individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism > median value of the Hofstede’s index on individualism) and (2) less individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism <= median of the Hofstede’s 
index on individualism). For Models (1)-(2), we use Eq. (1) and for the remaining models we use Eq. (2). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4  
The effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment on bank performance: High vs. low masculinity    
 Regulatory capital and masculinity  Regulatory environment and masculinity (High vs. low masculinity)          
 All banks  Separate   Separate            
 High Low High Low  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
 
Model # 
ROAA 
 (1) 
ROAA 
 (2) 
ROAA 
 (3) 
ROAA 
 (4) 
 ROAA 
 (5) 
ROAA 
 (6) 
ROAA 
 (7) 
ROAA 
 (8) 
ROAA 
 (9) 
ROAA 
 (10) 
ROAA 
 (11) 
ROAA 
 (12) 
ROAA 
 (13) 
ROAA 
 (14) 
ROAA 
 (15) 
ROAA 
 (16) 
Bank size -0.039 
(0.050) 
0.198*** 
(0.057) 
-0.027 
(0.048) 
0.198*** 
(0.057) 
 -0.022 
(0.049) 
0.222*** 
(0.062) 
-0.015 
(0.045) 
0.248*** 
(0.062) 
-0.029 
(0.047) 
0.226*** 
(0.061) 
-0.034 
(0.047) 
0.242*** 
(0.061) 
-0.028 
(0.048) 
0.246*** 
(0.062) 
-0.034 
(0.046) 
0.198*** 
(0.062) 
Bank credit exposure 0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
Tangibility  -0.249 
(0.231) 
-0.14** 
(0.057) 
-0.204 
(0.214) 
-0.137** 
(0.056) 
 -0.206 
(0.223) 
-0.161** 
(0.068) 
-0.336 
(0.309) 
-0.173*** 
(0.064) 
-0.214 
(0.216) 
-0.177*** 
(0.064) 
-0.214 
(0.216) 
-0.175*** 
(0.064) 
-0.211 
(0.220) 
-0.175*** 
(0.064) 
-0.229 
(0.214) 
-0.164*** 
(0.063) 
Non-operating income -0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
 -0.0112 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Growth assets 0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
 0.02*** 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
Regulatory capital 0.001 
(0.023) 
0.049*** 
(0.010) 
               
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic 
  -0.059*** 
(0.019) 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Conventional 
  0.033** 
(0.015) 
0.057*** 
(0.009) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × stringency 
     -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × stringency  
     0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Disclosure 
       -0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Disclosure 
       0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Audit 
         -0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Audit 
         0.019*** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Certified 
           -0.06*** 
(0.018) 
0.04** 
(0.016) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Certified 
           0.035** 
(0.015) 
0.056*** 
(0.009) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Entry  
             -0.01*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Entry  
             0.01*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × insurance  
               -0.061*** 
(0.017) 
0.035* 
(0.019) 
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × insurance 
               0.038** 
(0.016) 
0.051*** 
(0.009) 
GDP rate  0.006 
(0.046) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.044) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
 0.022 
(0.042) 
0.045** 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.066) 
0.035* 
(0.018) 
0.02 
(0.043) 
0.039** 
(0.018) 
0.02 
(0.043) 
0.037** 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.0428) 
0.0378** 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.043) 
0.046** 
(0.019) 
GDP per capita 1.02 
(0.680) 
1.267*** 
(0.319) 
0.761 
(0.714) 
1.211*** 
(0.322) 
 0.663 
(0.724) 
1.408*** 
(0.535) 
1.385 
(0.838) 
1.509*** 
(0.515) 
0.611 
(0.717) 
1.39*** 
(0.521) 
0.544 
(0.754) 
1.661*** 
(0.518) 
0.57 
(0.752) 
1.409*** 
(0.518) 
0.776 
(0.666) 
1.47*** 
(0.531) 
Inflation -0.019 
(0.070) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.073) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
 -0.011 
(0.069) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
0.121* 
(0.067) 
-0.044** 
(0.020) 
-0.012 
(0.068) 
-0.036* 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.071) 
-0.038* 
(0.020) 
-0.017 
(0.071) 
-0.041** 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.065) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
Concentration  -0.027* 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
 -0.031* 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.026 
(0.020) 
-0.02* 
(0.012) 
-0.033** 
(0.0162) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.036** 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.034* 
(0.017) 
-0.02 
(0.012) 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
-0.033*** 
(0.013) 
Constant -6.613 
(7.590) 
-8.75*** 
(3.028) 
-5.343 
(7.887) 
-8.713*** 
(3.029) 
 -1.892 
(4.993) 
-14.48** 
(6.338) 
-12.63 
(9.523) 
-16.58*** 
(5.924) 
-1.644 
(4.910) 
-15.45** 
(5.992) 
-0.950 
(5.308) 
-18.17*** 
(6.005) 
-1.25 
(5.281) 
-8.614** 
(4.108) 
-2.642 
(4.448) 
-12.67** 
(6.010) 
Observations 758 2,475 758 2,475  703 1,901 588 1,949 703 1,949 703 1,949 703 1,947 703 1,949 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2   19.53*** 2.11  25.53*** 3.86* 38.15*** 5.63** 23.46*** 4.32** 79.61*** 4.05** 29.25*** 5.71** 11.88*** 5.66** 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.237 0.208 0.324 0.212  0.34 0.222 0.378 0.239 0.341 0.229 0.338 0.203 0.34 0.238 0.342 0.192 
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.129 0.191 0.147  0.21 0.10 0.236 0.116 0.211 0.105 0.208 0.114 0.21 0.114 0.212 0.102 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using 
capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). In models (1)-(16), we breakdown the sample into 
two subsamples: (1) highly masculine (if the countries’ proxy for masculinity > median value of the Hofstede’s index on masculinity) and (2) less masculine (if the countries’ proxy for masculinity <= median of the Hofstede’s index on 
masculinity). For Models (1)-(2), we use Eq. (1) and for the remaining models we use Eq. (2). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5 
The effect of regulatory capital and regulatory environment on bank performance: High vs. low trust    
 Regulatory capital and Trust     Regulatory environment and Trust (High vs. low trust)           
 All banks  Separate   Separate            
 High Low High Low  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
 
Model # 
ROAA 
 (1) 
ROAA 
 (2) 
ROAA 
 (3) 
ROAA 
 (4) 
 ROAA 
 (5) 
ROAA 
 (6) 
ROAA 
 (7) 
ROAA 
 (8) 
ROAA 
 (9) 
ROAA 
 (10) 
ROAA 
 (11) 
ROAA 
 (12) 
ROAA 
 (13) 
ROAA 
 (14) 
ROAA 
 (15) 
ROAA 
 (16) 
Bank size 0.132** 
(0.053) 
0.059 
(0.048) 
0.135** 
(0.053) 
0.049 
(0.047) 
 0.122** 
(0.057) 
0.033 
(0.041) 
0.124** 
(0.05() 
0.069* 
(0.041) 
0.115** 
(0.055) 
0.054 
(0.042) 
0.133** 
(0.055) 
0.052 
(0.042) 
0.13** 
(0.055) 
0.054 
(0.042) 
0.125** 
(0.058) 
0.026 
(0.040) 
Bank credit exposure 0.011 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Tangibility  -0.242** 
(0.104) 
-0.120 
(0.119) 
-0.207** 
(0.097) 
-0.123 
(0.119) 
 -0.208* 
(0.109) 
-0.177 
(0.131) 
-0.197* 
(0.109) 
-0.214 
(0.149) 
-0.209* 
(0.109) 
-0.178 
(0.130) 
-0.198* 
(0.108) 
-0.177 
(0.130) 
-0.201* 
(0.108) 
-0.178 
(0.130) 
-0.216** 
(0.107) 
-0.176 
(0.129) 
Non-operating income -0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
 -0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
Growth assets 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
    0.003 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Regulatory capital 0.044*** 
(0.013) 
0.0227** 
(0.0100) 
               
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic 
  0.019 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Conventional 
  0.062*** 
(0.011) 
0.026*** 
(0.010) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × stringency 
     0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × stringency  
     0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Disclosure 
       0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Disclosure 
       0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Audit 
         0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Audit 
         0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Certified 
           0.014 
(0.019) 
-0.01 
(0.009) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Certified 
           0.058*** 
(0.012) 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Entry  
             0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Entry  
             0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × insurance  
               -0.004 
(0.025) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × insurance 
               0.059*** 
(0.012) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
GDP rate  -0.011 
(0.024) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.023) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
 -0.034 
(0.027) 
0.042* 
(0.024) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.032 
(0.025) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
-0.038 
(0.025) 
0.038 
(0.024) 
-0.038 
(0.025) 
0.039* 
(0.024) 
-0.044* 
(0.026) 
0.042* 
(0.023) 
GDP per capita -0.0727 
(0.501) 
1.454*** 
(0.518) 
-0.075 
(0.504) 
1.448*** 
(0.523) 
 -0.304 
(0.532) 
0.662 
(0.557) 
-0.039 
(0.026) 
0.955* 
(0.571) 
-0.443 
(0.526) 
0.701 
(0.547) 
-0.362 
(0.529) 
0.704 
(0.548) 
-0.418 
(0.528) 
0.632 
(0.544) 
-0.529 
(0.524) 
0.382 
(0.527) 
Inflation -0.065* 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.022) 
-0.057 
(0.037) 
-0.015 
(0.022) 
 -0.086** 
(0.042) 
-0.039 
(0.028) 
-0.084** 
(0.041) 
-0.044 
(0.028) 
-0.087** 
(0.042) 
-0.042 
(0.028) 
-0.091** 
(0.041) 
-0.043 
(0.028) 
-0.093** 
(0.041) 
-0.042 
(0.028) 
-0.109*** 
(0.040) 
-0.041 
(0.028) 
Concentration  -0.04*** 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.041** 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
 -0.061*** 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.082*** 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.061*** 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.07*** 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.067*** 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.222 
(3.878) 
-13.35** 
(5.887) 
0.297 
(5.805) 
-13.28** 
(5.882) 
 6.423 
(6.472) 
-5.013 
(6.157) 
9.512 
(6.372) 
-5.768 
(3.564) 
7.648 
(6.375) 
-3.848 
(3.553) 
6.865 
(6.389) 
-3.755 
(3.593) 
7.452 
(6.373) 
-5.150 
(6.085) 
11.88* 
(6.194) 
-1.188 
(3.386) 
Observations 1,120 1,541 1,120 1,541  1,002 1,272 1,007 1,159 1,007 1,274 1,007 1,274 1,007 1,272 1,007 1,274 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2   5.82** 3.8*  4.26** 7.49*** 7.71*** 10.85*** 4.3** 10.16*** 6.17** 10.05*** 5.74** 12.08*** 5.41** 14.7*** 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.244 0.207 0.27 0.215  0.288 0.156 0.296 0.184 0.282 0.168 0.299 0.167 0.295 0.167 0.31 0.168 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.112 0.148 0.118  0.168 0.04 0.182 0.064 0.163 0.054 0.182 0.052 0.182 0.053 0.199 0.053 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using 
capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). ). In models (1)-(16), we breakdown the sample 
into two subsamples: (1) high trust (if the countries’ proxy for general trust > median value of the WVS’s proxy on general trust) and (2) low trust (if the countries’ proxy for general trust <= median of the WVS’s proxy on general trust). 
For Models (1)-(2), we use Eq. (1) and for the remaining models we use Eq. (2). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in 
parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 6  
Alternative profitability and capital measures 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank operating profits (OPATA). Regulatory capital is bank Tier1 ratio scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is 
proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and 
deposit insurance scheme (insurance). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Variables High individualsim  Low individualsim  
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Panel A. The impact of individualism 
 
Regulatory capital 0.007 
(0.032) 
276  0.389/0.186 0.053*** 
(0.014) 
1,621  0.279/0.192 
Regulatory capital × Islamic -0.072*** 
(0.014) 
276 65.71*** 0.505/0.324 0.051*** 
(0.017) 
1,621 0.35 0.279/0.191 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.049** 
(0.019) 
   0.059*** 
(0.013) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
276 38.83*** 0.502/0.32 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
1,238 0.02 0.287/0.184 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
   0.009*** 
(0.002) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
276 90.64*** 0.504/0.322 0.028*** 
(0.009) 
1,166 0.17 0.302/0.198 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
   0.031*** 
(0.007) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit -0.036*** 
(0.007) 
276 65.91*** 0.505/0.332 0.027*** 
(0.009) 
1,272 0.09 0.284/0.182 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.025** 
(0.009) 
   0.029*** 
(0.007) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
-0.072*** 
(0.014) 
276 65.71*** 0.505/0.324 0.054*** 
(0.019) 
1,272 0.15 0.286/0.185 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.049** 
(0.019) 
   0.06*** 
(0.014) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
276 65.61*** 0.506/0.324 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
1,270 0.27 0.29/0.189 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.006** 
(0.002) 
   0.008*** 
(0.002) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
-0.079*** 
(0.012) 
276 95.92*** 0.488/0.318 0.069*** 
(0.025) 
1,272 0.1 0.297/0.198 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.037* 
(0.019) 
   0.075*** 
(0.015) 
   
Panel B. The impact of masculinity 
 
Variables Highly masculine  Less masculine  
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Regulatory capital 0.016 
(0.028) 
399  0.414/0.275 0.054*** 
(0.014) 
1,498  0.281/0.191 
Regulatory capital × Islamic -0.065*** 
(0.014) 
399 56.95*** 0.498/0.368 0.052*** 
(0.017) 
1,498 0.28 0.282/0.189 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.048*** 
(0.016) 
   0.059*** 
(0.013) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
-0.01*** 
(0.003) 
399 29.51*** 0.496/0.366 0.01*** 
(0.003) 
1,115 0.05 0.295/0.185 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
   0.009*** 
(0.00257) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
-0.024*** 
(0.004) 
293 86.38*** 0.558/0.423 0.028*** 
(0.009) 
1,149 0.16 0.295/0.188 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
   0.031*** 
(0.007) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit -0.032*** 
(0.007) 
399 57.1*** 0.498/0.369 0.027*** 
(0.009) 
1,149 0.04 0.291/0.183 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
   0.029*** 
(0.007) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
-0.065*** 
(0.014) 
399 56.95*** 0.498/0.368 0.056*** 
(0.0188) 
1,149 0.09 0.293/0.186 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.048*** 
(0.016) 
   0.061*** 
(0.015) 
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Tables 6 
Alternative profitability and capital measures – (Continued) 
(Continued) 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank-operating profits (OPATA). Regulatory capital is bank Tier1 ratio scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is 
proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and 
deposit insurance scheme (insurance). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Variables Highly masculine  Less masculine 
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Panel B. The impact of masculinity 
 
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
399 58.7*** 0.498/0.369 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
1,147 0.19 0.298/0.19 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
   0.008*** 
(0.002) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
-0.074*** 
(0.010) 
399 123.98*** 0.487/0.36 0.07*** 
(0.0254) 
1,149 0.06 0.305/0.199 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.038** 
(0.015) 
   0.076*** 
(0.016) 
   
Panel C. The impact of trust  
 
Variables Highly trustful Less trustful 
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Regulatory capital 0.044** 
(0.020) 
751  0.332/0.205 0.024 
(0.017) 
701  0.402/0.291 
Regulatory capital × Islamic 0.025 
(0.017) 
751 7.03*** 0.359/0.233 0.043 
(0.029) 
701 0.8 0.405/0.29 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.075*** 
(0.018) 
   0.024 
(0.017) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
0.003 
(0.003) 
728 6.57** 0.371/0.246 -0.004 
(0.004) 
515 2.19 0.374/0.234 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
   0.001 
(0.003) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
0.006 
(0.008) 
728 8.02*** 0.368/0.242 -0.01 
(0.010) 
411 4.55** 0.423/0.278 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
   0.004 
(0.009) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit 0.01 
(0.008) 
728 6.4** 0.367/0.242 -0.011 
(0.012) 
517 3.11* 0.376/0.236 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
   0.004 
(0.009) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
0.02 
(0.017) 
728 6.59** 0.368/0.243 -0.021 
(0.024) 
517 3.11* 0.378/0.236 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.069*** 
(0.018) 
   0.008 
(0.019) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  0.002 
(0.002) 
728 6.59** 0.368/0.243 -0.002 
(0.003) 
515 3.13* 0.377/0.238 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
   0.002 
(0.002) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
-0.008 
(0.015) 
728 25.22*** 0.384/0.261 -0.038** 
(0.017) 
517 12.18*** 0.383/0.245 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.071*** 
(0.019) 
   0.017 
(0.012) 
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Table 7 
Higher cut-off point  
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 
scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), 
certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country 
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Variables High individualsim  Low individualsim  
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Panel A. The impact of masculinity 
 
Regulatory capital -0.024 
(0.024) 
371  0.317/0.111 0.049*** 
(0.009) 
2,862 0.203 0.198/0.124 
Regulatory capital × Islamic -0.079*** 
(0.023) 
371 20.88*** 0.487/0.325 0.039*** 
(0.013) 
2,862 2.89* 0.203/0.128 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.025** 
(0.010) 
   0.057*** 
(0.008) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
371 21.43*** 0.488/0.326 0.006** 
(0.003) 
2,233 1.04 0.186/0.104 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
   0.008*** 
(0.001) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
256 19.81*** 0.493/0.311 0.02** 
(0.00772) 
2,281 1.95 0.196/0.114 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
   0.028*** 
(0.004) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit -0.039*** 
(0.012) 
371 21.47*** 0.488/0.326 0.018** 
(0.008) 
2,281 1.71 0.188/0.105 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
   0.026*** 
(0.004) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
-0.079*** 
(0.023) 
371 20.88*** 0.487/0.325 0.037** 
(0.015) 
2,281 2.34 0.195/0.114 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.025** 
(0.010) 
   0.056*** 
(0.009) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  -0.01*** 
(0.003) 
371 21.03*** 0.487/0.325 0.005** 
(0.002) 
2,279 2.23 0.196/0.114 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.003** 
(0.001) 
   0.007*** 
(0.001) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
-0.078*** 
(0.023) 
371 22.02*** 0.489/0.328 0.031 
(0.019) 
2,281 1.56 0.184/0.102 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
   0.051*** 
(0.009) 
   
Panel A. The impact of trust  
 
Variables Highly trustful Less trustful 
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Regulatory capital 0.038* 
(0.019) 
503  0.286/0.136 0.033*** 
(0.008) 
2,158  0.201/0.128 
Regulatory capital × Islamic 0.009 
(0.017) 
503 8.44*** 0.327/0.18 0.016 
(0.017) 
2,158 2.19 0.209/0.135 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.072*** 
(0.019) 
   0.037*** 
(0.008) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
392 8.98*** 0.334/0.184 0.002 
(0.003) 
1,882 2.15 0.174/0.09 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
   0.003*** 
(0.001) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
392 10.02*** 0.346/0.199 0.003 
(0.010) 
1,774 3.03* 0.191/0.107 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
   0.017*** 
(0.004) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit -0.001 
(0.008) 
392 5.68** 0.32/0.168 0.005 
(0.009) 
1,889 3.01* 0.183/0.101 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
   0.019*** 
(0.004) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
0.004 
(0.017) 
392 8.08*** 0.347/0.201 0.01 
(0.018) 
1,889 2.91* 0.182/0.099 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.072*** 
(0.023) 
   0.037*** 
(0.008) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  0.001 
(0.002) 
392 7.67*** 0.341/0.193 0.001 
(0.002) 
1,887 2.96* 0.183/0.101 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
   0.005*** 
(0.001) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
-0.031* 
(0.017) 
392 29.85*** 0.386/0.248 0.001 
(0.021) 
1,889 3.1* 0.178/0.096 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.08*** 
(0.026) 
   0.034*** 
(0.007) 
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Table 8  
Alternative cultural mesures 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled 
by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified 
audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). In different models, we breakdown the sample into various subsamples: (1) 
higher institutional collectivism values, higher gender egalitarianism values, and higher trust in government (if the countries’ proxy for the cultural measure > median 
of the respective measure) and (2) : (1) higher institutional collectivism values, higher gender egalitarianism values (if the countries’ proxy for the cultural measure 
<= median of the respective measure). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Panel A. Institutional collectivism values  
Variables Highly collectivist Less collectivist 
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Regulatory capital 0.055*** 
(0.010) 
1,312  0.224/0.121 -0.025 
(0.018) 
521  0.242/0.071 
Regulatory capital × Islamic 0.044*** 
(0.014) 
1,312 1.29 0.226/0.12 -0.058*** 
(0.016) 
521 23.79*** 0.383/0.238 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.058*** 
(0.010) 
   0.024** 
(0.010) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
989 2.99* 0.204/0.076 -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
492 29.05*** 0.412/0.268 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
   0.005*** 
(0.002) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
989 4.24** 0.221/0.096 -0.024*** 
(0.006) 
379 37.49*** 0.467/0.308 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
   0.01*** 
(0.004) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit 0.015* 
(0.008) 
989 2.6 0.203/0.076 -0.028*** 
(0.007) 
494 28.88*** 0.41/0.266 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
   0.014*** 
(0.005) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
0.033** 
(0.016) 
989 4.25** 0.221/0.096 -0.057*** 
(0.015) 
494 27.04*** 0.408/0.264 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.059*** 
(0.010) 
   0.026*** 
(0.009) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  0.004** 
(0.002) 
989 4.09** 0.217/0.091 -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
492 27.83*** 0.409/0.264 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
   0.003*** 
(0.001) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
0.02 
(0.018) 
989 4.31** 0.2/0.072 -0.059*** 
(0.015) 
494 26.42*** 0.402/0.257 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.05*** 
(0.011) 
   0.024** 
(0.009) 
   
Panel B.  Gender egalitarianism values 
 
Variables High gender egalitarianism values Low gender egalitarianism values 
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Regulatory capital 0.075*** 
(0.022) 
636  0.353/0.184 0.013* 
(0.008) 
521  0.334/0.15 
Regulatory capital × Islamic 0.074*** 
(0.023) 
636 0.04 0.353/0.177 0.013 
(0.009) 
521 0.01 0.334/0.144 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.077*** 
(0.020) 
   0.014 
(0.009) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
422 0.2 0.436/0.255 0.002* 
(0.001) 
428 2.53 0.301/0.065 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
   0.003** 
(0.001) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
422 0.05 0.433/0.25 0.000 
(0.003) 
474 5.08** 0.246/0.019 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.038*** 
(0.01) 
   0.006* 
(0.003) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit 0.033*** 
(0.011) 
422 0.05 0.423/0.238 -0.001 
(0.003) 
474 2.78* 0.244/0.016 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
   0.005 
(0.004) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
0.067*** 
(0.023) 
422 0.02 0.425/0.24 -0.000 
(0.006) 
474 2.78* 0.244/0.016 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.064*** 
(0.020) 
   0.011 
(0.008) 
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Table 8 
Alternative cultural measures – (Continued) 
(Continued) 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled 
by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified 
audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). In different models, we breakdown the sample into various subsamples: (1) 
higher institutional collectivism values, higher gender egalitarianism values, and higher trust in government (if the countries’ proxy for the cultural measure > median 
of the respective measure) and (2) : (1) higher institutional collectivism values, higher gender egalitarianism values (if the countries’ proxy for the cultural measure 
<= median of the respective measure). The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
  
Panel B.  Gender egalitarianism values 
Variables High gender egalitarianism values Low gender egalitarianism values 
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  0.009*** 
(0.003) 
422 0.1 0.433/0.251 -0.000 
(0.001) 
474 3.12* 0.244/0.017 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
   0.001 
(0.001) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
0.081*** 
(0.028) 
422 0.06 0.432/0.249 0.006 
(0.007) 
474 4.3** 0.255/0.031 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.086*** 
(0.026) 
   0.021** 
(0.008) 
   
Panel C. Trust in the government    
 
Variables High trust in the government  Low trust in the government 
 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 Coef.  N Wald-test R2/Adjusted R2 
Regulatory capital 0.034*** 
(0.011) 
1,580  0.194/0.096 0.025* 
(0.014) 
877  0.168/0.065 
Regulatory capital × Islamic 0.016 
(0.016) 
1,580 4.17** 0.211/0.112 -0.039 
(0.030) 
877 6.15*** 0.208/0.106 
Regulatory capital × conventional  0.043*** 
(0.009) 
   0.037*** 
(0.013) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
0.002 
(0.003) 
1,313 5.06** 0.187/0.073 -0.011** 
(0.005) 
759 7.19*** 0.203/0.10 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
stringent 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
   0.003 
(0.002) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
0.006 
(0.008) 
1,282 5.65** 0.2/0.082 -0.023*** 
(0.008) 
680 15.27*** 0.228/0.12 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
disclosure 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
   0.013** 
(0.006) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × audit 0.005 
(0.008) 
1,318 6.38** 0.196/0.084 -0.034** 
(0.013) 
759 8.97*** 0.204/0.101 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
audit 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
   0.009 
(0.006) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
0.011 
(0.017) 
1,318 6.33** 0.197/0.085 -0.068** 
(0.027) 
759 10.41*** 0.219/0.117 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
certified  
0.046*** 
(0.008) 
   0.027** 
(0.013) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × entry  0.001 
(0.002) 
1,318 6.37** 0.197/0.084 -0.008** 
(0.003) 
759 11.28*** 0.218/0.116 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
entry  
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
   0.003** 
(0.002) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
-0.001 
(0.018) 
1,318 5.07** 0.176/0.061 -0.07*** 
(0.025) 
759 20.07*** 0.252/0.155 
Regulatory capital × conventional × 
insurance 
0.035*** 
(0.008) 
   0.051*** 
(0.014) 
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Table 9 
System GMM regression of profitability on bank capital-regulation link 
 Baseline   Institutional environment  
 All banks Separate   Separate      
Model # (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag ROAA 
 
0.197*** 
(0.054) 
0.314*** 
(0.050) 
 0.378*** 
(0.058) 
0.387*** 
(0.062) 
0.377*** 
(0.059) 
0.380*** 
(0.059) 
0.375*** 
(0.059) 
0.381*** 
(0.063) 
 
Bank size 0.166* 
(0.090) 
0.174** 
(0.069) 
 0.107 
(0.068) 
0.041 
(0.072) 
0.088 
(0.074) 
0.111 
(0.073) 
0.099 
(0.071) 
0.007 
(0.061) 
Bank credit exposure 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
Tangibility  0.066 
(0.087) 
0.122 
(0.077) 
 0.031 
(0.086) 
0.039 
(0.093) 
0.041 
(0.088) 
0.039 
(0.088) 
0.032 
(0.088) 
0.05 
(0.077) 
Non-operating income -0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Growth assets 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Regulatory capital 0.028** 
(0.011) 
        
Regulatory capital × Islamic  -0.008 
(0.013) 
       
Regulatory capital × conventional   0.049*** 
(0.0104) 
       
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
   -0.002 
(0.002) 
     
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× stringent 
   0.005*** 
(0.001) 
     
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
    -0.01* 
(0.006) 
    
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× disclosure 
    0.011*** 
(0.004) 
    
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
audit 
     -0.008 
(0.006) 
   
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× audit 
     0.015*** 
(0.005) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
      -0.011 
(0.012) 
  
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× certified  
      0.035*** 
(0.010) 
  
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
entry  
       -0.002 
(0.001) 
 
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× entry  
       0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
        -0.038*** 
(0.012) 
Regulatory capital × conventional 
× insurance 
        0.012** 
(0.005) 
GDP rate  0.062*** 
(0.011) 
0.062*** 
(0.012) 
 0.093*** 
(0.014) 
0.101*** 
(0.015) 
0.096*** 
(0.014) 
0.096*** 
(0.014) 
0.096*** 
(0.014) 
0.098*** 
(0.015) 
GDP per capita 0.058 
(0.065) 
0.071 
(0.054) 
 0.102* 
(0.052) 
0.074 
(0.063) 
0.08 
(0.053) 
0.092* 
(0.055) 
0.098* 
(0.053) 
0.014 
(0.044) 
Inflation 0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.016) 
 -0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
Concentration  -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Constant -2.21* 
(1.149) 
-3.057*** 
(0.909) 
 -1.081 
(0.963) 
-0.638 
(0.946) 
-1.335 
(1.088) 
-1.596 
(1.076) 
-1.298 
(1.015) 
-0.565 
(0.970) 
Observations 2,363 2,363  1,903 1,797 1,909 1,909 1,908 1,909 
Fisher (Prob>F, p-value) 11.85*** 22.37***  23.32*** 24.43*** 23.29*** 24.47*** 24.87*** 24.08*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (z, p-value) -3.94*** -4.2***  -3.34*** -3.24*** -3.33*** -3.32*** -3.33*** -3.37*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) (z, p-value) -1.10 -0.75  -0.91 -0.84 -0.87 -0.9 -0.91 -0.77 
Sargan test (Chi-square, p-value) 2575.98*** 1005.2***  969.59*** 925.12*** 968.76*** 958.9*** 966.22*** 955.76*** 
Hansen test (Chi-square, p-value) 400.74 369.84  331.59 325.52 334.44 336.32 337.58 343.97 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 29.23*** 29.23***  16.73*** 19.73*** 18.2*** 19.02*** 20.34*** 16.27*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled 
by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified 
audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). The estimation is based on 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed 
effects. Instrumental variables for bank regulatory capital include legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and durability of the political system. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 10 
Heckman estimation technique 
 Baseline   Institutional environment  
 All banks Separate   Separate      
Model # (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank size 0.215*** 
(0.062) 
0.187*** 
(0.057) 
 0.227*** 
(0.075) 
0.256*** 
(0.076) 
0.28*** 
(0.076) 
0.281*** 
(0.074) 
0.281*** 
(0.074) 
0.227*** 
(0.074) 
Bank credit exposure 0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
 0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
Tangibility  -0.108 
(0.077) 
-0.099 
(0.074) 
 -0.203** 
(0.102) 
-0.214* 
(0.110) 
-0.201** 
(0.100) 
-0.197** 
(0.099) 
-0.194** 
(0.099) 
-0.206** 
(0.095) 
Non-operating income -0.01** 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
 -0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.01* 
(0.006) 
-0.01* 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
Growth assets 0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
 0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
Regulatory capital 0.04*** 
(0.010) 
        
Regulatory capital × Islamic  0.006 
(0.016) 
       
Regulatory capital × 
conventional  
 0.05*** 
(0.008) 
       
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
stringent 
   0.003 
(0.003) 
     
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × stringent 
   0.008*** 
(0.002) 
     
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
disclosure 
    0.004 
(0.008) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × disclosure 
    0.023*** 
(0.005) 
    
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
audit 
     0.008 
(0.009) 
   
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × audit 
     0.029*** 
(0.005) 
   
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
certified 
      0.018 
(0.018) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × certified  
      0.059*** 
(0.011) 
  
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
entry  
       0.002 
(0.002) 
 
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × entry  
       0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 
Regulatory capital × Islamic × 
insurance  
        -0.006 
(0.019) 
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × insurance 
 
 
       0.038*** 
(0.009) 
GDP rate  0.085*** 
(0.013) 
0.083*** 
(0.013) 
 0.143*** 
(0.020) 
0.177*** 
(0.021) 
0.148*** 
(0.019) 
0.156*** 
(0.020) 
0.154*** 
(0.019) 
0.157*** 
(0.019) 
GDP per capita 0.122 
(0.085) 
0.085 
(0.076) 
 0.351*** 
(0.097) 
0.37*** 
(0.100) 
0.382*** 
(0.094) 
0.349*** 
(0.095) 
0.361*** 
(0.095) 
0.316*** 
(0.097) 
Inflation rate 0.009 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
 0.001 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.000 
(0.015) 
-0.000 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
Concentration  -0.011*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
 -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Inverse Mills -0.57** 
(0.263) 
-0.431* 
(0.227) 
 -0.626* 
(0.355) 
-0.857** 
(0.355) 
-0.848** 
(0.346) 
-0.822** 
(0.341) 
-0.809** 
(0.347) 
-0.844** 
(0.348) 
Constant -1.315 
(0.855) 
-1.772** 
(0.790) 
 0.0342 
(1.205) 
-0.362 
(1.306) 
-0.725 
(1.266) 
-0.974 
(1.264) 
-0.953 
(1.258) 
-0.179 
(1.218) 
Observations 2,455 2,455  1,546 1,441 1,553 1,553 1,551 1,553 
F-test (p-value) 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R-squared 0.095 0.125  0.189 0.19 0.195 0.196 0.198 0.18 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2  10.89***  5.58** 8.02*** 6.96*** 6.84*** 7.07*** 5.39*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of 
Tier1+Tier2 scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), 
licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). The estimation is based on 2SLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Instrumental variables for bank regulatory capital includes legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and 
durability of the political systems. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** 
denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
44 
  
Table 11  
A propensity score matching technique 
 All sample High Low 
 Treated Control Diff.  
(T stat) 
Treated Control Diff.  
(T stat) 
Treated Control Diff.  
(T stat) 
K-Nearest neighbors (n = 3) 
All sample 1.641 0.546 1.095 
(0.123)*** 
      
Masculinity    0.799 0.571 0.228 
(0.209) 
1.813 0.528 1.285*** 
(0.147) 
Individualism    0.58 0.333 0.246 
(0.267) 
1.793 0.655 1.138*** 
(0.140) 
Trust    1.662 0.665 0.997*** 
(0.199) 
1.405 1.24 0.164 
(0.133) 
K-Nearest neighbors (n = 7) 
All sample 1.641 0.601 1.04*** 
(0.116) 
      
Masculinity    0.799 0.669 0.13 
(0.195) 
1.813 0.412 1.401*** 
(0.138) 
Individualism    0.58 0.318 0.262 
(0.270) 
1.793 0.491 1.302*** 
(0.131) 
Trust    1.662 0.72 0.942*** 
(0.187) 
1.405 1.221 
 
0.184 
(0.132) 
K-Nearest neighbors (n = 10) 
All sample 1.641 0.597 1.044*** 
(0.114) 
      
Masculinity    0.799 0.702 0.097 
(0.192) 
1.813 0.465 1.348*** 
(0.135) 
Individualism    0.58 0.416 0.164 
(0.261) 
1.793 0.564 0.229*** 
(0.129) 
Trust    1.662  0.997*** 
(0.181) 
1.405 1.175 0.23* 
(0.128) 
1-to-1 matching with no replacement  
All sample 1.746 0.933 0.813*** 
(0.076) 
      
Masculinity    0.799 0.62 0.179 
(0.156) 
1.813 1.019 0.861*** 
(0.095) 
Individualism    0.58 0.405 0.174 
(0.199) 
1.793 0.82 0.82*** 
(0.089) 
Trust    1.872 0.619 1.252*** 
(0.130) 
1.405 1.125 0.28*** 
(0.103) 
Kernel matching          
All sample 1.641 0.617 1.024*** 
(0.107) 
      
Masculinity    0.799 0.613 0.186 
(0.198) 
1.813 0.686 1.127*** 
(0.131) 
Individualism    0.58 0.264 0.316 
(0.266) 
1.793 0.698 1.095*** 
(0.124) 
Trust    1.662 0.683 0.979*** 
(0.177) 
1.405 1.197 0.208* 
(0.125) 
Radius matching          
All sample 1.641 0.933 0.708*** 
(0.060) 
      
Masculinity    0.799 0.73 0.069 
(0.134) 
1.813 1.019 0.794*** 
(0.068) 
Individualism    0.58 0.492 0.088 
(0.176) 
1.793 1.041 0.752*** 
(0.066) 
Trust    1.662 0.619 1.043*** 
(0.082) 
1.405 1.132 0.273*** 
(0.085) 
Notes: This table presents the results from regressing the proxy of bank performance (measured as the return on average assets) on the regulatory capital and 
other control variables over the 1999–2013 period for a matched sample using a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach. The propensity scores are computed 
using logistic regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if both bank types’ regulatory capital ratios have values greater 
than or equal to the median, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the rest of control variables from our main regression model. We employ four 
propensity matching methods: K-Nearest neighbors with nearest neighbor (n = 5), with nearest neighbor (n = 7), and with nearest neighbor (n = 10), 1-to-1 
matching with no replacement, Kernel matching, and Radius matching. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Appendix A 
Table A.1.  
Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Data Sources 
Dependent variables – performance   
Net income to average assets (ROAA) Bank net income divided as a percentage of three-year average assets. Bankscope 
Operating profits (OPATA)  Bank operating profits as a percentage of total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Independent variables  
1. Capital ratios  
Regulatory capital ratio This ratio is the capital adequacy ratio. It is the sum of bank Tier 1 plus Tier 
2 capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. This ratio must be 
maintained at a level of at least 8% under the Basel II rules.  
Bankscope 
Tier 1 capital ratio This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets computed under the Basel rules. Banks must maintain 
minimum Tier 1 capital of at least 4%. 
As above 
2. Bank control variables 
Bank size  The natural logarithm of total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Growth assets ratio The current year growth rate of bank total assets compared with the previous 
year’s total assets. 
Bankscope 
Non-operating income ratio Total non-interest operating income as a percentage of total assets.  Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Credit exposure ratio The share of net loans as a percentage of total assets. As above 
Tangibility  Bank fixed assets as a percentage of total assets.  As above 
Islamic bank dummy variable (IBDV) A dummy variable that equals 1 for Islamic banks and 0 otherwise. As above 
Conventional bank dummy variable 
(CBDV) 
A dummy variable that equals 1 for conventional banks and 0 otherwise. As above 
3. Country control variables 
GDP rate The annual percentage growth rate of a country’s GDP. As above 
GDP per capita Logarithm of the annual gross domestic product per capita As above 
Inflation  The Inflation rate, based on changes in the consumer price index As above 
Concentration  The fraction of total assets of the three largest banks in each country as a 
percentage of the country’s total banking sector assets  
As above 
4. Regulatory and institutional control variables  
Capital stringency (CS) This variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see details 
therein). The variable increases by 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1–6 of 
their survey with no increase if the answer is no. The opposite occurs for 
questions 7 and 8. It is an indicator based on the following questions: (1) Is 
the minimum required capital asset ratio (risk weighted) in line with the Basel 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with market risk? (3–5) Before 
determining minimum capital adequacy, are any of the following deducted 
from the book value of capital: (a) the market value of loan losses not realized 
on the financial statements, (b) unrealized losses on securities portfolios, and 
(c) unrealized foreign exchange losses? (6) Have regulatory/supervisory 
authorities verified the sources of funds to be used as capital? (7) Can assets 
other than cash or government securities provide the initial or subsequent 
injections of capital? (8) Can borrowed funds provide the initial disbursement 
of capital?  
Banking regulation 
and supervision 
database, World 
Bank; Barth et al. 
(2000, 2003, 2008) 
Information disclosure (Disclosure) This variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see details 
therein). The variable increases by 1 if the answer is yes to the three following 
questions: (1) Does the income statement includes accrued or unpaid interest 
or principal in non-performing loans? (2) Are banks required to produce 
consolidated financial statements? (3) Are bank directors legally liable if 
information disclosed is erroneous or misleading?  The variable thus ranges 
between 1 and 3 with higher values indicating more informative bank account.  
As above 
Audit  This variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see details 
therein). It indicates whether there are specific requirements for external 
auditor to examine bank financial statements. The variable thus ranges 
between 0 and 2 with higher values indicating more requirements.  
As above 
Certified  This variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see details 
therein). It indicates whether the required external auditor is licensed or 
certified.   
As above 
Entry requirements (entry) This variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see details 
therein). The variable increases by 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1–8 of 
their survey with no increase if the answer is no. The variable addresses 8 
questions with higher values indicating stricter entry requirements:  
Regarding the legal submissions required for banking license: (1) is the legal 
submission drafted by-laws? (2) Does the legal submission require an 
intended organization chart? (3) Does the legal submission require first 3-year 
financial projections? (4) Does the legal submission require financial 
information on shareholders? (5) Does the legal submission require 
background/experience of future directors? (6) Does the legal submission 
require background/experience of future managers? (7) Does the legal 
As above 
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Variable Definition Data Sources 
submission require sources of funds in capitalization of new bank? (8) Does 
the legal submission require information on the intended market 
differentiation of new bank? 
Deposit insurance (insurance) A dummy variable that equals 1 if a country has an explicit deposit insurance 
and 0 otherwise. 
As above 
5. Culture values control variables 
Individualism  Hofstede’s cultural index on individualism  Hofstede (2001) 
Masculinity  Hofstede’s cultural index on masculinity  As above 
Trust  A general trust measure based on the following question: ““Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful on dealing with people?”   
World Values 
Surveys 
Institutional collectivism values House (2004)’s cultural index on institutional collectivism   The GLOBE project 
Gender egalitarianism values House (2004)’s cultural index on gender egalitarianism    As above 
Confident in the government  The extent to which people have confidence in decisions made by their 
government ((Yes = 1; No = 0).  
World Values 
Surveys 
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Table 12 
System GMM regression of profitability on bank capital-regulation link: High vs. low individualism    
 Baseline and individualism     Institutional environment and individualism (High vs. low individualism)            
 All banks  Separate   Separate            
 High Low High Low  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Model # ROAA 
 (1) 
ROAA 
 (2) 
ROAA 
 (3) 
ROAA 
 (4) 
 ROAA 
 (5) 
ROAA 
 (6) 
ROAA 
 (7) 
ROAA 
 (8) 
ROAA 
 (9) 
ROAA 
 (10) 
ROAA 
 (11) 
ROAA 
 (12) 
ROAA 
 (13) 
ROAA 
 (14) 
ROAA 
 (15) 
ROAA 
 (16) 
Lagged ROAA 
 
 
0.438*** 
(0.077) 
0.134** 
(0.060) 
0.296*** 
(0.0999) 
0.017 
(0.058) 
 0.269*** 
(0.090) 
0.13** 
(0.058) 
0.239** 
(0.102) 
0.156*** 
(0.058) 
0.271*** 
(0.096) 
0.123* 
(0.063) 
0.296*** 
(0.099) 
0.138** 
(0.059) 
0.237 
(1.006) 
0.132** 
(0.061) 
0.243** 
(0.103) 
0.133** 
(0.061) 
Bank size -0.025 
(0.054) 
0.134 
(0.116) 
-0.034 
(0.055) 
0.142 
(0.131) 
 -0.041 
(0.051) 
0.304* 
(0.156) 
-0.044 
(0.043) 
0.322* 
(0.170) 
-0.043 
(0.051) 
0.257 
(0.163) 
-0.034 
(0.055) 
0.305** 
(0.154) 
-0.023 
(0.627) 
0.28* 
(0.153) 
-0.027 
(0.068) 
0.086 
(0.127) 
Bank credit exposure -0.000 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
 0.001 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.013 
(0.097) 
0.0148*** 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.0115** 
(0.005) 
Tangibility  -0.204 
(0.246) 
0.000 
(0.098) 
-0.021 
(0.235) 
-0.022 
(0.126) 
 0.063 
(0.214) 
-0.039 
(0.136) 
0.025 
(0.216) 
0.002 
(0.134) 
0.031 
(0.226) 
0.0136 
(0.128) 
-0.021 
(0.235) 
0.012 
(0.134) 
0.25 
(2.579) 
0.008 
(0.131) 
0.027 
(0.178) 
-0.012 
(0.127) 
Non-operating income -0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
 -0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.063) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Growth assets 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
 0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.064) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
Regulatory capital 0.006 
(0.008) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
               
Regulatory capital × Islamic   -0.043 
(0.038) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Conventional 
  0.028* 
(0.014) 
0.064*** 
(0.016) 
             
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× stringency 
     -0.007 
(0.00447) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × stringency  
     0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
          
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Disclosure 
       -0.015 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Disclosure 
       0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
        
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Audit 
         -0.022 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Audit 
         0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.007) 
      
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Certified 
           -0.043 
(0.038) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Certified 
           0.028* 
(0.014) 
0.055*** 
(0.014) 
    
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× Entry  
             -0.005 
(0.016) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Entry  
             0.007 
(0.021) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
  
Regulatory capital × Islamic 
× insurance  
               -0.056** 
(0.024) 
-0.041** 
(0.018) 
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × insurance 
               0.023 
(0.015) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
GDP rate  0.061** 
(0.028) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.065*** 
(0.024) 
0.024* 
(0.013) 
 0.057** 
(0.022) 
0.054*** 
(0.017) 
0.056** 
(0.022) 
0.066*** 
(0.018) 
0.063*** 
(0.023) 
0.062*** 
(0.019) 
0.065*** 
(0.024) 
0.061*** 
(0.016) 
0.056 
(0.150) 
0.062*** 
(0.017) 
0.058** 
(0.025) 
0.056*** 
(0.016) 
GDP per capita -0.415** 
(0.192) 
0.084 
(0.099) 
-0.331** 
(0.147) 
0.117 
(0.104) 
 -0.438*** 
(0.157) 
-0.179 
(0.116) 
-0.535*** 
(0.163) 
-0.129 
(0.122) 
-0.384** 
(0.159) 
-0.098 
(0.119) 
-0.331** 
(0.147) 
-0.111 
(0.110) 
-0.098 
(0.119) 
-0.113 
(0.115) 
-0.562*** 
(0.157) 
0.088 
(0.092) 
Inflation 0.007 
(0.038) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.045) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
 0.043 
(0.048) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
0.036 
(0.049) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.043) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.015 
(0.045) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
0.038 
(0.784) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
Concentration  -0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
 -0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Constant 6.121*** 
(2.278) 
-1.879 
(1.461) 
4.366** 
(2.061) 
-2.697 
(1.644) 
 6.122*** 
(1.884) 
-3.116 
(1.930) 
7.377*** 
(1.604) 
-3.727** 
(1.855) 
5.336*** 
(1.940) 
-3.384 
(2.109) 
4.366** 
(2.061) 
-4.079** 
(1.982) 
-3.384 
(2.109) 
-3.551* 
(1.902) 
7.257*** 
(1.943) 
-1.679 
(1.657) 
Observations 304 2059 304 2059  304 1599 304 1493 304 1605 304 1605 304 1604 304 1605 
Fisher (Prob>F, p-value) 23.29*** 8.3*** 8.15*** 6.49***  11.88*** 5.71*** 12.53*** 6.91*** 9.38*** 5.53*** 8.15*** 6.2*** 23.01*** 6.21*** 7.89*** 6.68*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (z, p-
value) 
-2.49** -3.32*** -2.48** -2.9***  -2.37** -2.39** -2.29** -2.36** -2.4** -2.31** -2.48** -2.37*** -0.57 -2.38*** -2.32** -2.5** 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) (z, p-
value) 
0.46 -1.5 0.49 -2.06  0.48 -1.57 0.41 -1.52 0.48 -1.56 0.49 -1.58 0.1 -1.56 0.46 
 
-1.43 
Sargan test (Chi-square, p-
value) 
251.5*** 2325.6**
* 
279.1*** 2134.1***  277.8*** 2242.3*** 279.04*** 2105.4*** 278.8*** 2231.7*** 279.1*** 2207.5*** 279.1*** 2225.4*** 282.59*** 2216.4*** 
Hansen test (Chi-square, p-
value) 
48.48 338.71 48.4 286;67  48.61 271.79 52.07 263.64 49;18 274.44 48.4 274.24 46.12 275;12 51.01 278.58 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2   3.51* 20.48***  6.27** 13.36*** 7.89*** 13.66*** 6.31** 13.67*** 3.51* 16.09*** 1.29 14.9*** 8.43*** 13.73*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using 
capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). In models (1)-(16), we breakdown the sample into 
two subsamples: (1) highly individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism > median value of the Hofstede’s index on individualism) and (2) less individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism <= median of the Hofstede’s 
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index on individualism) and we run regressions using Eqs. (1)–(2) as well. The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses 
below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 13 
System GMM regression of profitability on bank capital-regulation link: High vs. low masculinity    
 Baseline and masculinity     Institutional environment and masculinity (High vs. low masculinity)            
 All banks  Separate   Separate            
 High Low High Low  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Model # ROAA 
 (1) 
ROAA 
 (2) 
ROAA 
 (3) 
ROAA 
 (4) 
 ROAA 
 (5) 
ROAA 
 (6) 
ROAA 
 (7) 
ROAA 
 (8) 
ROAA 
 (9) 
ROAA 
 (10) 
ROAA 
 (11) 
ROAA 
 (12) 
ROAA 
 (13) 
ROAA 
 (14) 
ROAA 
 (15) 
ROAA 
 (16) 
Lagged ROAA 
 
 
0.333*** 
(0.09) 
0.082 
(0.068) 
0.217*** 
(0.079) 
0.062 
(0.063) 
 0.183** 
(0.084) 
0.194*** 
(0.057) 
0.197** 
(0.090) 
0.196*** 
(0.058) 
0.181** 
(0.089) 
0.189*** 
(0.060) 
0.186** 
(0.082) 
0.205*** 
(0.057) 
0.179** 
(0.087) 
0.197*** 
(0.058) 
0.197** 
(0.095) 
0.199*** 
(0.062) 
Bank size 0.074 
(0.062) 
0.285* 
(0.150) 
0.0540 
(0.0565) 
0.265* 
(0.135) 
 0.054 
(0.058) 
0.313 
(0.200) 
-0.016 
(0.066) 
0.351* 
(0.197) 
0.061 
(0.052) 
0.288 
(0.218) 
0.053 
(0.047) 
0.351* 
(0.200) 
0.055 
(0.054) 
0.33* 
(0.199) 
0.008 
(0.057) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
Bank credit exposure 0.008 
(0.007) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
 0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
0.01* 
(0.005) 
Tangibility  -0.05 
(0.161) 
0.001 
(0.139) 
-0.025 
(0.144) 
0.007 
(0.135) 
 0.017 
(0.163) 
-0.049 
(0.158) 
-0.067 
(0.201) 
0.007 
(0.160) 
0.03 
(0.153) 
-0.001 
(0.155) 
0.018 
(0.139) 
0.02 
(0.158) 
0.026 
(0.153) 
0.014 
(0.159) 
-0.003 
(0.199) 
-0.041 
(0.145) 
Non-operating income 0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
 0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Growth assets 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
 0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Regulatory capital 0.014 
(0.020) 
0.049*** 
(0.016) 
               
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic 
  -0.041 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Conventional 
  0.031** 
(0.012) 
0.074*** 
(0.017) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × stringency 
     -0.007 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × stringency  
     0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Disclosure 
       -0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Disclosure 
       0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.03*** 
(0.008) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Audit 
         -0.024** 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Audit 
         0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Certified 
           -0.048* 
(0.025) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Certified 
           0.038*** 
(0.013) 
0.06*** 
(0.016) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × Entry 
             -0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × Entry  
             0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × insurance  
               -0.066*** 
(0.024) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × insurance 
               0.011 
(0.014) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
GDP rate  0.064** 
(0.025) 
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
0.064*** 
(0.022) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
 0.053*** 
(0.020) 
0.06*** 
(0.016) 
0.067** 
(0.025) 
0.062*** 
(0.016) 
0.055*** 
(0.021) 
0.068*** 
(0.016) 
0.055*** 
(0.021) 
0.067*** 
(0.016) 
0.053*** 
(0.020) 
0.065*** 
(0.016) 
0.063*** 
(0.022) 
0.063*** 
(0.016) 
GDP per capita -0.147** 
(0.067) 
-0.015 
(0.135) 
-0.146* 
(0.079) 
0.055 
(0.119) 
 -0.207** 
(0.093) 
-0.223* 
(0.125) 
-0.055 
(0.095) 
-0.14 
(0.117) 
-0.177** 
(0.084) 
-0.157 
(0.130) 
-0.178** 
(0.072) 
-0.165 
(0.119) 
-0.193** 
(0.090) 
-0.168 
(0.123) 
-0.133 
(0.084) 
0.019 
(0.094) 
Inflation -0.032 
(0.030) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.030) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
 -0.036 
(0.033) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.042) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.026 
(0.032) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.026 
(0.032) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.025 
(0.032) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.026 
(0.035) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
Concentration  -0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
 -0.007 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Constant -0.197 
(0.901) 
-3.359* 
(1.996) 
-0.368 
(0.873) 
-4.753** 
(1.833) 
 0.407 
(0.899) 
-3.331 
(2.436) 
-0.113 
(0.974) 
-4.327* 
(2.452) 
-0.363 
(1.098) 
-3.546 
(2.772) 
-0.155 
(0.919) 
-4.573* 
(2.496) 
-0.025 
(1.050) 
-4.302* 
(2.497) 
0.508 
(1.399) 
-1.261 
(2.015) 
Observations 660 1,703 660 1,703  605 1,298 493 1,304 605 1,304 605 1,304 605 1,303 605 1,304 
Fisher (Prob>F, p-value) 13.91*** 7.54*** 9.39*** 8.39***  11.73*** 7.27*** 13.32*** 7.94*** 10.85*** 7.08*** 12.21*** 7.83*** 12.32*** 7.89*** 11.2*** 8.08*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (z, 
p-value) 
-2.23*** 
 
-2.9*** -2.28*** -2.83***  -2.94*** -2.3*** -2.63*** -2.27** -2.94*** -2.24** -3.01*** -2.25** -2.92*** -2.26** -2.94*** -2.4*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) (z, 
p-value) 
0.96 -1.88* 1.05 -1.95*  601.62*** -1.46 0.7 -1.47 0.58 -1.46 0.59 -1.49 0.56 -1.47 
 
0.64 -1.32 
Sargan test (Chi-square, 
p-value) 
582.4*** 1915.8**
* 
614.75*** 1886.7**
* 
 115.73 2023.4*** 486.3*** 2010.8*** 606.9*** 2031.0*** 606.9*** 1994.2*** 607.1*** 2000.5*** 619.59*** 2004.4*** 
Hansen test (Chi-square, 
p-value) 
96.92 260.86 100.51 270.0***  90.12 242.9 80.02 249.03 90.57 247.08 87.6 248.4 89.9*** 242.74 87.2 249.06 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2   7.79*** 19.13***  13.67*** 16.5*** 14.67*** 18.44*** 15.17*** 15.19*** 14.92*** 19.09*** 16.31*** 19.62*** 10.23*** 14.49*** 
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Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using 
capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). In models (1)-(16), we breakdown the sample into 
two subsamples: (1) highly individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism > median value of the Hofstede’s index on individualism) and (2) less individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism <= median of the Hofstede’s 
index on individualism) and we run regressions using Eqs. (1)–(2) as well. The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses 
below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 14 
System GMM regression of profitability on bank capital-regulation link: High vs. low trust    
 Baseline and trust     Institutional environment and trust (High vs. low trust)         
 All banks  Separate   Separate            
 High Low High Low  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Model # ROAA 
 (1) 
ROAA 
 (2) 
ROAA 
 (3) 
ROAA 
 (4) 
 ROAA 
 (5) 
ROAA 
 (6) 
ROAA 
 (7) 
ROAA 
 (8) 
ROAA 
 (9) 
ROAA 
 (10) 
ROAA 
 (11) 
ROAA 
 (12) 
ROAA 
 (13) 
ROAA 
 (14) 
ROAA 
 (15) 
ROAA 
 (16) 
Lagged ROAA 
 
 
0.353*** 
(0.062) 
0.362*** 
(0.081) 
0.186*** 
(0.062) 
0.162** 
(0.071) 
 0.281*** 
(0.074) 
0.162** 
(0.071) 
0.281*** 
(0.072) 
0.201*** 
(0.068) 
0.279*** 
(0.074) 
0.159** 
(0.072) 
0.276*** 
(0.074) 
0.156** 
(0.072) 
0.281*** 
(0.071) 
0.156** 
(0.071) 
0.262*** 
(0.077) 
0.142** 
(0.070) 
Bank size 0.194*** 
(0.062) 
0.008 
(0.069) 
0.272** 
(0.113) 
-0.058 
(0.095) 
 0.327** 
(0.146) 
-0.04 
(0.091) 
0.26** 
(0.129) 
-0.028 
(0.084) 
0.311** 
(0.154) 
-0.017 
(0.085) 
0.333** 
(0.147) 
-0.019 
(0.089) 
0.326** 
(0.142) 
-0.031 
(0.091) 
0.305** 
(0.126) 
-0.077 
(0.087) 
Bank credit exposure 0.005 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.009** 
(0.005) 
 -0.005 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.009** 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
Tangibility  -0.133 
(0.106) 
0.07 
(0.144) 
-0.118 
(0.138) 
0.057 
(0.127) 
 -0.139 
(0.147) 
-0.086 
(0.127) 
-0.129 
(0.166) 
-0.123 
(0.153) 
-0.119 
(0.150) 
-0.054 
(0.131) 
-0.115 
(0.151) 
-0.052 
(0.127) 
-0.12 
(0.153) 
-0.058 
(0.113) 
-0.151 
(0.148) 
-0.128 
(0.121) 
Non-operating income 0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
 -0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
Growth assets 0.004 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
 0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003)  
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic 
0.025* 
(0.013) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
               
Regulatory capital × 
conventional  
  -0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × stringent 
  0.046*** 
(0.017) 
0.039*** 
(0.012) 
             
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × stringent 
     0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × disclosure 
     0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
          
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × disclosure 
       -0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic ×  audit 
       0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
        
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × audit 
         -0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × certified 
         0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
      
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × certified  
           -0.004 
(0.019) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × entry  
           0.048*** 
(0.016) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
    
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × entry  
             -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic × insurance  
             0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
  
Regulatory capital × 
conventional × insurance 
               -0.019 
(0.018) 
-0.033** 
(0.014) 
Regulatory capital × 
Islamic 
               0.027** 
(0.011) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
GDP rate  0.089*** 
(0.017) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
0.108*** 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
 0.108*** 
(0.018) 
0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.133*** 
(0.022) 
0.053** 
(0.023) 
0.119*** 
(0.019) 
0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.119*** 
(0.020) 
0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.12*** 
(0.019) 
0.044** 
(0.020) 
0.153*** 
(0.034) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
GDP per capita -0.26*** 
(0.088) 
0.185* 
(0.094) 
-0.238*** 
(0.071) 
0.198* 
(0.120) 
 -0.322*** 
(0.088) 
-0.011 
(0.131) 
-0.259*** 
(0.085) 
-0.003 
(0.118) 
-0.294*** 
(0.085) 
-0.001 
(0.115) 
-0.27*** 
(0.078) 
0.006 
(0.118) 
-0.283*** 
(0.078) 
-0.005 
(0.121) 
-0.137 
(0.092) 
-0.096 
(0.127) 
Inflation -0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
 -0.021 
(0.028) 
-0.014 
(0.020) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.028) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.031) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
0.033 
(0.038) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
Concentration  0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
 -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Constant -1.428 
(1.466) 
-0.362 
(0.787) 
-3.632* 
(2.010) 
0.167 
(0.968) 
 -2.093 
(2.079) 
1.069 
(0.952) 
-1.625 
(2.018) 
0.515 
(0.938) 
-2.167 
(2.322) 
0.485 
(1.145) 
-3.006 
(2.292) 
0.456 
(1.080) 
-2.675 
(2.181) 
0.701 
(0.935) 
-4.114* 
(2.307) 
721 
(0.931) 
Observations 877 1170 877 1170  766 965 771 854 771 966 771 966 771 965 771 966 
Fisher (Prob>F, p-value) 20.1*** 7.14*** 12.85*** 4.6***  11.38*** 4.15*** 12.82*** 6.37*** 11.79*** 4.72*** 12.73*** 4.57*** 13.32*** 4.5*** 7.87*** 4.84*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (z, 
p-value) 
-2.69*** -2.68*** -2.65*** -2.5***  -2.15*** -2.86*** -2.16** -2.84*** -2.15** -2.83*** -2.11** -2.82*** -2.13** -2.84*** -2.21** -2.87*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) (z, 
p-value) 
-0.55 -0.67 -0.94 -1.06  -0.73*** -1.16 -0.72 -1.12 -0.7 -1.21 -0.71 -1.22 -0.71 -1.21 -0.82 -1.15 
Sargan test (Chi-square, 
p-value) 
372.85**
* 
850.09**
* 
944.75*** 1344.93*
** 
 1141.56*** 1209.61**
* 
1122*** 1090.3*** 1145;04**
* 
1213.28**
* 
1126.84*
** 
1212.43**
* 
1131.59*
** 
1213;87**
* 
1109.16**
* 
1197.62**
* 
Hansen test (Chi-square, 
p-value) 
120.21 210.9 121.48 215.3  98.82 196.05 97.86 130.4 104.83 198.15 102.7 197.96 102.54 195.71 93.07 199.92 
H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2   9.29*** 8.0***  9.13*** 6.54** 10.99*** 6.21** 8.19*** 6.81*** 13.42*** 6.96*** 12.9*** 6.88*** 10.15*** 9.12*** 
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Notes: The dependent variable is bank return on average assets (ROAA). Regulatory capital is bank capital adequacy ratio measured as the sum of Tier1+Tier2 scaled by risk-weighted assets. Regulatory environment is proxied using 
capital stringency (stringent), information disclosure (disclosure), licensed audit (audit), certified audit (certified), entry requirements (entry), and deposit insurance scheme (insurance). In models (1)-(16), we breakdown the sample into 
two subsamples: (1) highly individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism > median value of the Hofstede’s index on individualism) and (2) less individualistic (if the countries’ proxy for individualism <= median of the Hofstede’s 
index on individualism) and we run regressions using Eqs. (1)–(2) as well. The estimation is based on multivariate regressions with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses 
below their coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
